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ABSTRACT 
 
“Thank God It’s Only Maneuvers!:” Tennessee and the Road to War 
by  
Joshua G. Savage 
 
 
“Thank God It’s Only Maneuvers!:” Tennessee and the Road to War offers the reader a 
comprehensive explanation of the importance of the Tennessee Maneuvers of June 1941 to 
American preparation for World War II. Beginning with pre-war changes in the infantry, 
followed by the inception of the Armored Force, and continuing through the testing of both 
during the 1941 Maneuvers, the reader will gain an appreciation of the significance of these 
actions to overall American preparation before and during the Second World War. This work 
also presents a look at how these extensive combat actions influenced the people of the State of 
Tennessee throughout their existence.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
“The damned city hall was not on the map!” were the iconic words issued by General 
George S. Patton Jr. following the collision of one of his tanks with the Bell Buckle, Tennessee, 
City Hall. Like that city hall, the 1941 Tennessee Maneuvers have long been off the map in 
regards to academic historical study. Later eclipsed by the much larger and more heavily studied 
Louisiana and Carolina Maneuvers of the same year, the Tennessee Maneuvers of 1941 have 
fallen by the wayside, left to exist as mere footnotes to its larger successors. As the sands of time 
have washed away many memories of these invaluable maneuvers, few recall the significant 
contributions that these war-games made to the U.S. Army.  
Historians often mention the Tennessee Maneuvers in passing, with the maneuvers 
themselves barely receiving mention in larger works. Without examining the Tennessee 
Maneuvers, the narrative of the American military in World War II remains incomplete. Most 
historians agree that the training received in the United States prior to and during the war 
contributed greatly to the Allied victory, but the Tennessee Maneuvers remain largely ignored, 
despite their inherent value to the overall narrative of pre-war preparation. No work has 
comprehensively examined pre-war developments in American infantry and armor in relation to 
the Tennessee Maneuvers of 1941. Indeed, as Carlo D’Este notes in Patton: A Genius for War, 
the Tennessee Maneuvers only receive extensive mention in the history of the 2
nd
 Armored “Hell 
on Wheels” Division.1 The Tennessee maneuvers remain largely neglected despite their vital role 
in the history of the U.S. Military. This is an oversight this thesis hopes to rectify. 
Historian Christopher Gabel’s The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941, published by the 
Center of Military History in 1991, focuses exclusively on the maneuver period of 1941 but only 
                                                          
1
 Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War, (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 881.  
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mentions the Tennessee component of these maneuvers in passing. The work attributes a paltry 
page and a half to the contributions of the maneuvers to pre-war preparation, with extensive 
focus falling on pre-war developments, followed by entire chapters devoted to the Louisiana and 
Carolina Maneuvers. Gabel briefly mentions developments in anti-tank and armored doctrine 
brought about by the Tennessee Maneuvers, as well as the various problems encountered by the 
units in Tennessee, but provides only a brief summation of the action and its contributions. He 
does mention, however, the importance of the maneuvers in the formation of armored doctrine.  
 Woody McMillin’s work, In the Presence of Soldiers: The 2nd Army Maneuvers and 
Other World War II Activity in Tennessee, published in 2010, currently stands as the only work 
almost exclusively focusing on the Tennessee Maneuvers from 1941-1945. The maneuvers 
conducted in Tennessee would test the army on a corps vs. corps level, providing an evaluation 
tool that would prove critical in evaluating officers, troops, and equipment, as well as the 
development of military tactics that became standard practice throughout the war. McMillin’s 
work is the first attempt at describing the maneuvers in detail and provides a solid chronological 
timeline of the maneuvers while incorporating them into the history of the state during the 
period.  
 Hell on Wheels: the 2d Armored Division, by Donald Eugene Houston, focuses on the 
history of one of the first two armored divisions in the history of the United States Army. 
Houston notes, “Historians of armor stress that in the two decades following World War I, petty 
branch jealousies and conservative, almost reactionary, leadership in infantry and cavalry 
prevented the creation of a mechanized or armored force before 1940.”2 The facts are 
undeniable. Army leadership refused to acknowledge the value of armor during the interwar 
period and resisted the adoption of armored divisions until 1940. General Marshall only 
                                                          
2
 Donald Eugene Houston, Hell on Wheels: the 2d Armored Division, (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1975), 31. 
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authorized the creation of the Armored Force following successful demonstrations from 
Armored Force proponent Adna Chaffee in Louisiana during the summer of 1940 and after 
witnessing the rapid successes enjoyed by Hitler’s panzer divisions in Europe in 1939 and 1940. 
Houston’s work details the history of the 2nd Armored Division, as well as the complicated 
background of armor in the United States. Houston’s work offers a critical evaluation of the unit 
during the Tennessee Maneuvers and focuses on the benefits of pre-war preparation for war. 
According to Patton, the 2d Armored learned valuable lessons and realized that the mistakes 
made during the maneuvers justified their existence.  He knew, “the tanks’ vulnerability must be 
recognized. It was folly to think of charging antitank guns with the intention of crushing them 
beneath their tracks.”3 Armored tactics developed during the maneuvers would prove vital in 
winning the war.  
 A comprehensive study of these war-games will restore the Tennessee Maneuvers to their 
proper place in the historical context. To understand the importance of the maneuvers, a number 
of developments necessitate mention. The infantry branch of the U.S. Army underwent extensive 
changes and subsequently transformed during the interwar years, with most changes occurring in 
the years immediately preceding the Second World War. The armored branch, meanwhile, did 
not even exist until the year prior to the outbreak of the war. The changes enacted during this 
period revolutionized the U.S. Army and precipitated further reforms that would enable it to fight 
the Second World War effectively, without relying on outdated technology and tactics from the 
Great War. These changes were first tested on a large scale during the Tennessee Maneuvers of 
June 1941. The lessons learned in the state ultimately led to the implementation of corrective 
measures before deployment overseas, thus saving American lives. Furthermore, the maneuvers 
not only influenced changes in the military but in the State of Tennessee as well. The presence of 
                                                          
3
 Houston, 69.  
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the military and its personnel in Depression Era Tennessee changed the lives of local 
Tennesseans throughout the maneuver period. Understanding the economic and social impacts of 
the maneuvers will allow the reader to gain a comprehensive understanding of the impact of the 
maneuvers on the military, state, and people as a whole.  
 This thesis presents a comprehensive examination of the Tennessee Maneuvers in a 
manner that incorporates military, social, and economic events into one cohesive unit. In chapter 
two, the evolution of the infantry during the interwar period, including the shift from square to 
triangular divisions, training, and outfitting are explained thoroughly throughout this chapter. 
The reader is introduced to key figures in the pre-war Army, including the Army Chiefs of Staff 
during the 1930s, including Douglas MacArthur, Malin Craig, and George C. Marshall. Their 
reforms and preparatory measures taken during the interwar period laid the framework for the 
Army that took the field in World War II. The reader is also introduced to the leader of GHQ 
(Army General Headquarters), General Leslie McNair, and 2
nd
 Army Commander, General Ben 
Lear. This chapter thoroughly details the first half of the June Maneuvers that focused 
exclusively on infantry actions. Many of these actions were theoretical in nature, with the enemy 
existing only on paper. This period allowed the infantry to learn in the field what it could not 
learn in basic training, such as movement, maneuver, and concealment in a real environment. All 
their training, however, was geared toward preparing for the second phase of the maneuvers, the 
arrival of Patton’s 2nd Armored Division.  
 Chapter three focuses almost exclusively on the armored branch of the U.S. Army with 
special emphasis on the 2
nd
 Armored Division and the second half of the Tennessee Maneuvers. 
Beginning with the struggle for the creation of the Armored Force under General Adna Chaffee 
during the interwar period, this chapter details the struggle for an independent Armored Force 
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following World War I, as well as the eventual creation, training, and subsequent field testing of, 
the 2
nd
 Armored Division which participated in combat maneuvers for the first time in mid-June 
1941. The primary importance of the Tennessee Maneuvers rested with the field-testing of the 
2
nd
 Armored Division. Many in the military were still unconvinced as to the soundness of 
armored doctrine, especially those clinging to the antiquated armored theories held over from the 
Great War. The performance of the 2
nd
 Armored in Tennessee proved, undeniably, that the 
doctrine developed by Chaffee and implemented by Patton in the field in Tennessee would be the 
doctrine that won victory for the armored forces of the United States in World War II.  
 The fourth chapter switches focus from the strictly military emphasis of the previous two 
chapters and analyzes the socioeconomic impact of the military on the State of Tennessee.  From 
1941 onward, the presence of the military profoundly affected the state’s populace, bringing a 
massive influx of resources into the state and affecting the daily lives of thousands within the 
maneuver area. Throughout the maneuver period, locals lived in a simulated warzone, with 
numerous roads shut off to civilian access, bridges crushed under the weight of American armor, 
and fences and other property destroyed by military equipment. Troops swarmed local towns and 
cities while on leave, and local establishments struggled to keep pace with demand. Not all the 
effects of the maneuvers were negative, however, as innumerable businesses prospered with the 
influx of new customers. Even locals not previously in business for themselves began 
entrepreneurial pursuits in an effort to capitalize on the new market. Many local shopkeepers 
sold more goods during this period than in most of the previous year. Indeed, with troops 
desiring creature comforts, locals eagerly acquiesced by providing home cooked meals, fresh 
produce, fresh water, and evening entertainment in the form of square dances and festivals. The 
maneuvers proved to be a crucial boom for a stagnant state economy. 
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 Through this work, readers should be able to grasp the immense importance of the 1941 
Tennessee Maneuvers and the effects of this operation on both the military and the state it 
occupied. General Marshall and his predecessors as Army Chief of Staff enacted structural and 
doctrinal reforms to prepare the U.S. Army for the looming conflict throughout the 1930s. The 
Army staged its first large-scale field-test of these changes in Tennessee throughout June 1941 
and learned valuable lessons that would prepare it to face the Axis Powers in Europe and Asia. 
The presence of the Army also had a profound effect upon the people of the state as well, 
altering the lives of native Tennesseans throughout the maneuver period. The strategies, tactics, 
and lessons learned in the fields of Tennessee ultimately helped the U.S. Army prepare for the 
coming conflict and gave its forces the tools it needed to accomplish its goals overseas. Through 
this work, readers will hopefully begin to understand the reasons why these pivotal maneuvers 
cannot, and should not, be forgotten.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 GIVE US THE TOOLS AND WE’LL FINISH THE JOB 
With the Tennessee Maneuvers soon to begin, Heinz L. Werle of River Grove, Illinois, 
moved into Tennessee in June 1941 along with over 50,000 of his fellow servicemen. Werle, like 
his compatriots, expressed his disdain at the state of affairs in the Army throughout the 
maneuvers. While on a twenty-mile march into the state, he complained about the rations given 
to the troops, lambasting the “horse-cock” (bologna) and “clog-ass” (cheese) sandwiches that 
comprised their mess kits.
4
 For Werle, the maneuvers were a nuisance. Rations were poor, 
sanitation was questionable, and the oppressive Southern climate made for difficult living 
conditions. He expressed his disdain for his “glorious leader, the general, sitting in his command 
car in the shade, sipping his ice-cold Coca-Cola as he reviewed his men struggling down the 
road.”5 Hardships aside, Werle carefully observed the poor state of affairs in the army at the 
time. Supplies were short, and equipment was scarce or non-existent. Describing the weaponry 
available to men at the time, he writes, “Grenades (beer cans filled with sand) were thrown at 
quarter ton trucks which had signs on their sides which read ‘I am a tank’. We, the U.S. Army, 
were sorta [sic] low on equipment and vehicles in those days.”6 The army that took to the field in 
Tennessee during the summer of June 1941 suffered from numerable hardships and supply 
shortages but was a drastic improvement from the force that existed during the interwar period. 
Though by no means a modern Army, the lessons learned by enlisted men and officers during the 
Tennessee Maneuvers would prove invaluable in the coming conflict.  
                                                          
4
 Heinz L. Werle, Heinz Werle Papers, unpublished manuscript, Box 13, Folder 215, US Army Heritage and 
Education Center, Carlisle, PA, 3.  
5
 Werle, 4.  
6
 Werle, 4-5.  
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 With war consuming the European continent, it became increasingly apparent that the 
United States would prove unable to avoid the conflagration. With that in mind, top officials in 
the United States Army began to realize that its forces were in no shape to defend the country let 
alone fight the fascists in Europe or Asia. This realization led many in the Army, including Chief 
of Staff George C. Marshall, to conclude that the situation required immediate rectification. 
Marshall chose to take immediate action to bring the Army up to fighting strength by authorizing 
the expansion, training, and outfitting of a modern military. In order to reach the goals 
established by General Marshall, conscription would be implemented, and military maneuvers 
would be scheduled across the country to augment the training programs already in place. Once 
the troops completed basic training, they would be put to the test in the field.  
The first of these large-scale military maneuvers came to Tennessee in June 1941. 
Though small in comparison to later maneuvers, these corps level exercises tested many 
elements of the new army for the first time. The maneuvers would expose, the Army hoped, the 
strengths and weaknesses of its infantry training programs, as well as test the men in the field. In 
addition to these objectives, the maneuvers would also expose weak links in the chain of 
command, allowing abler officers to advance and those deemed unsatisfactory to be removed. 
The first half of the Tennessee Maneuvers would test the infantry and its ability to operate in the 
field. The second half of the maneuvers, however, would test the infantrymen against a full 
armored division, the first ever fielded by the United States Army.
7
 Through these crucial war 
games, the Army learned the lessons needed to perfect its training programs and prepare its men 
for the coming war. Without these war games, the Army’s first experience in combat would have 
been overseas rather than at home. Overseas the bullets would be real, but at home they were 
                                                          
7
 Associated Press, “Army is Ready for Long Test in Maneuvers,” Chattanooga Daily Times, June 2, 1941.  
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only blanks. Mistakes at home could be corrected easily, but mistakes abroad could cost men 
their lives.   
With war looming, it became apparent to the U.S. Military that the peacetime army was 
woefully unprepared to protect the United States from outside aggression. “We didn’t know how 
soon war would come, but we knew it was coming. We didn’t know when we’d have to fight, 
but we knew it might come at any time, and we had to get together something [sic] of an Army 
pretty darn fast.”8 As historian Christopher Gabel notes in his landmark work The U.S. Army 
GHQ Maneuvers of 1941, “Twenty years of inadequate funding and skeletonized units had made 
the U.S. Army little more than a token establishment.”9 The unpreparedness of the military 
necessitated the rapid transition from a peacetime to a wartime footing and the immediate 
training and equipping of a modern military. 
 Following the German attack on Poland in September 1939 that demonstrated the success 
of new Blitzkrieg tactics and weapons, the U.S. Army moved swiftly to implement a long 
projected program of modernization.
 10
 Anticipating the necessity for such a move already in the 
early 1930s, Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur and his successor Malin Craig drafted the 
Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP).
11
 The PMP called for a series of programs that would bring 
the U.S. Military to a firm footing in the event of war with Japan, the only potential foe seen as a 
threat at the time. This plan proved instrumental in the rapid military buildup that took place 
preceding American entry into World War II.  
                                                          
8
 Christopher R. Gabel, The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941, (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 
United States Army, 1992), 8. 
9
 Gabel, 5.  
10
 Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War, (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 393.  
11
 Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of 
America, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 397. 
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 The dilapidated state of U.S. forces produced a difficult situation. The goal of this 
ambitious project called for the hasty mobilization of a small, combat effective army in a little 
under eight months. This small force, Army commanders believed, would be able to successfully 
defend the United States from hostile action. The PMP called for the raising of an Army 
consisting of 1,224,357 men trained and equipped with modern doctrines and armaments. With 
this new force, the Army believed it could successfully carry out its national duty.
12
 
Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall began the task of revitalizing the United 
States Army, then the 17
th
 strongest military in the world, just behind Romania when Marshall 
took over as acting Chief of Staff on July 1, 1939.
 13
 He inherited a practically non-existent 
Army, and in his report upon taking office, Marshall writes, “On July 1 the active Army of the 
United States consisted of approximately 174,000 enlisted men scattered over 130 posts, camps 
and stations. . .Within the United States we had no field army. There existed the mere framework 
of about three and one-half square divisions approximately fifty percent complete as to 
personnel.”14 By the beginning of 1940 the situation was little better, as the U.S. Army consisted 
of around 243,095 men, while the National Guard possessed a meager 226,837 men.
15
 Preparing 
the military for war would be difficult, but with Marshall’s guidance the country set about the 
task with renewed vigor. To bolster the ranks and give Marshall the troops necessary to 
implement the PMP, Congress prepared to pass the first peace-time draft in U.S. history by 
debating the Burkes-Wadsworth Bill (Selective Service Act) during the summer of 1940.
16
  
                                                          
12
 Gabel, 9.  
13
 Gabel, 8. 
14
 George C. Marshall, Henry H. Arnold, and Ernest J. King, The War Reports of General of the Army George C. 
Marshall, General of the Army Henry H. Arnold, and Fleet Admiral Earnest J. King, (Philadelphia and New York: J.P. 
Lippincott Company, 1947), 16.  
15
 Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of 
Ground Combat Troops, (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987), 2-3.  
16
 Ronald G. Van Tyne, “Congress Votes First American Peacetime Draft: Ready for President’s Signature; Bund 
Protests,” The Sunday Morning Star, September 15, 1940.  
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General Marshall pleaded with Congress to enact the draft for months prior to its eventual 
passage. The entire application of the PMP relied on the immediate influx of men and materiel 
into Federal Service, and without this the plan would falter. On August 5, 1940, Marshall was 
quoted by the New York Times, “It was expected that in the process of obtaining authority for 
these various measures, there would be, of necessity, a period of discussion and debate, 
particularly with relation to a Selective Service Act; however, the passage of weeks-this loss of 
time-is a constantly growing embarrassment to the War Department.”17 He went further, “Time-
and let me repeat-time is our pressing necessity today, and our man power is the only thing 
which can be provided on short notice. We must train men immediately against the possibilities 
of the next few months, which may be the most critical in the history of this country.”18 Marshall 
fumed at the delays in Congress and feared that defending the country without the draft would be 
impossible. Indeed, in 1939 following Roosevelt’s Emergency Proclamation Marshall wrote, 
“The urgent necessity for Army maneuvers involving large units was manifest. For the past five 
years field training had been limited to the assembly of the four paper organizations, called field 
armies, once every four years, and then only for a two-week period, of which about five days 
could be devoted to very limited action due to lack of motor transportation and the unseasoned 
state of the National Guard personnel.”19 Marshall continued his pleas to Congress throughout 
the month of August 1940, saying that it was “urgently necessary to have selective service as 
quickly as possible.”20 The New York National Guard Maneuvers, Marshall knew, would 
provide the evidence necessary to conclude the debate and enact the draft.  
                                                          
17
Staff, “Marshall Urges Speeding of Draft: Staff Chief Says Delay Puts the Preparedness Program in Serious 
Jeopardy,” The New York Times, August 6, 1940.  
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Marshall, et. al., War Reports, 18.  
20
 Frank L. Kluckhorn, “Marshall Warns of Big Army Need,” The New York Times, August 17, 1940.  
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Congressional deliberations regarding the draft quickly concluded with the passage on 
September 9
th
, 1940, of a Selective Service Act, due to concerns regarding the National Guard. 
National Guardsmen and reservists gathered in the summer of 1940 to prove to the Army that 
they could defend the nation if called upon to do so. The 200,000 men of the National Guard’s 
so-called “combat ready” units assembled in camps across the country and prepared to stage 
maneuvers to display their state of readiness. In an “off the record” speech to the National Guard 
Association on October 27, 1939, General Marshall remarked, “The knowledge that has been 
common in the Army for generations, that the only way to learn how to do things properly is to 
get out on the ground and actually do them.”21 Though the exercises would prove him correct, 
they did so in a manner most disconcerting.  
The ensuing debacle only helped prove Marshall’s argument that the National Guard 
must fall under Federal control, and that the Army must completely reevaluate its training 
program. Troops frequently collapsed from exhaustion in the field, discipline proved practically 
non-existent, officers failed to issue coherent orders, division and brigade commanders proved 
unable to coordinate weapons and units under their command, communications failed, and 
logistical failures often left Guardsmen without food.
22
 When President Roosevelt visited the 
troops in mid-August, his soldiers reported to him, “that they were so handicapped by lack of 
equipment that in some instances they were drilling with drain pipes instead of regular trench 
mortars and broomsticks instead of machine guns. . . (and) during his inspection trip the 
President saw trucks which had been used to simulate tanks during the manoeuvers. He also saw 
lines of converted taxicabs pressed into service for motor transport.”23 Indeed, this complete 
                                                          
21
 Larry Bland, ed. The Papers of George Catlett Marshall: We Cannot Delay July 1, 1939-December 6, 1941, 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 97. 
22
 Marshall, et. al., 13.  
23
 Kenneth Campbell, “Army is Inspected by the President,” The New York Times, August 18, 1940.  
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failure by the National Guardsmen to demonstrate the most basic proficiencies alarmed Army 
leaders in Washington. As Marshall later stated,“Americans who had opposed conscription in the 
belief that the National Guard represented a combat-ready force were rudely shaken. The 1940 
summer encampments demonstrated beyond dispute that, in terms of ground forces the nation 
was virtually defenseless.”24 
To complement the proposed draft, the Senate authorized the President to “mobilize the 
National Guard and Organized Reserves for a year’s training.”25 Though the army increased in 
size numerically, most of its divisions existed only on paper. New recruits and draftees soon 
gave flesh to these skeleton divisions, but they remained inferior to European forces in 
composition, equipment, and training. Due to the passage of the Selective Service Act a month 
later, the regular army swelled to 1.2 million men, comprised of some 300,000 National 
Guardsmen, 600,000 draftees, and 300,000 regular army troops by the time the United States 
entered the war in 1941.
26
 Still, according to the Victory Program put forth by the Army in 
September 1941, the war would require “some 8.7 million men, divided into a ground army of 
6.7 million capable of fielding 213 divisions (half armored or motorized) and an Army air force 
of 2 million and 195 air groups.”27  
Though the army increased substantially in size under the PMP, the stockpiles of modern 
equipment called for under the plan, however, were unavailable. As the 1940 maneuvers 
indicated, supplies of weaponry, be it modern or antiquated, simply did not exist. Congress 
considered the stockpiling of such supplies unfeasible and did not authorize funding for new 
weaponry until President Roosevelt declared a National Emergency on 8 September 1939. The 
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supplies were in production, but stockpiles were dangerously low. Only the army’s regular 
divisions would be outfitted first, with the National Guard and draftees to follow. Without the 
new weaponry the troops required, defense of the homeland would prove a difficult, if not 
impossible, task. New weaponry would be disbursed to the troops once it became available, but 
until that occurred, troops would make do with what they possessed or could manufacture 
themselves. Despite this setback, General Marshall pushed forward with his implementation of 
the PMP and began to reform the infantry divisions, that then existed as relics of the First World 
War.
28
 
Due to limited funding the Army received from Congress during the interwar period, 
modern equipment and training remained sparse. The army suffered from a shortage of weapons, 
“starting with rifles and ending in tanks and adequate 1940-era artillery.”29 Indeed, the lack of 
Congressional appropriations led the Army to make the best of what it had available. This led the 
Army to reevaluate its usage of equipment and technology. Standard equipment in 1939 still 
included the M-1917 pie-plate helmets, as well as the 1903 Springfield rifle.
30
 The Army sought 
to apply knowledge gained during World War I to implement the changes necessary to fight the 
coming war. New equipment, while not yet ready, would play a vital role in the coming conflict.  
 One of the first steps in structural modernization involved moving from a “square” 
division to a “triangular” division. The square division was a relic of World War I. The square 
division consisted of 28,000 men, divided into two brigades, four regiments, and twelve 
battalions along with artillery, cavalry, engineers, signal corps, and machine gunners.
31
 The 
square divisions possessed twice as many men as any German, French, or British units in World 
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War I, and used this mass of manpower to engage the enemy for extended periods without 
needing reinforcement. The square division’s downfall resided within its sheer mass; the size of 
the unit made it unwieldy and difficult to coordinate, as well as making rapid movement virtually 
impossible. The numbers required to operate these divisions also proved impractical. During 
World War I, the Army struggled to staff its divisions. To fully flesh out its 58 divisions 
oftentimes required the cannibalization of other units, resulting in many understrength divisions. 
The square division proved ideal for the style of warfare practiced in World War I, with its 
artillery regiments firing rolling barrages, and the infantry battalions advancing in waves 
afterwards. By 1940, these tactics, like the division itself, proved hilariously obsolete.   
 During the interwar period, the transition from the square to the triangular division 
structure proved a difficult task. Officers who fought in the trenches in World War I held to the 
belief that the division must be able to support itself for long periods without reinforcement. 
Forward thinking officers, like George C. Marshall, however, believed the exact opposite. The 
United States must mobilize hastily, rendering the training of such a large division incredibly 
difficult if not impossible. Developments during the interwar period also made the square 
division functionally obsolete. As the Axis powers rolled across Europe, the American military 
took notice of the success of the triangular division structure employed by the Germans. With 
this in mind, the U.S. Army moved to shed infantry divisions of heavy supporting elements in 
favor of mobility and maneuver. Fortunately, the move towards the triangular division was well 
underway, as General Marshall had ordered its implementation immediately after becoming 
Chief of Staff. The smaller divisions composed of numerous combat teams and specialized units 
22 
 
offered the Army a way to quickly mobilize for war and maximize the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the United States’ fighting forces.32 
After the dismantling of the square divisions, the Army turned its focus to training and 
equipping its units for modern warfare. Even General Pershing, once an ardent supporter of the 
square division and its tactics, realized the need for change as early as 1919. Taken under review 
by the Superior Board, composed of many of the Allied Expeditionary Force’s best minds, it was 
determined that “Trench warfare has produced unwieldy and somewhat immobile units . . . 
Situations of that character will, in the future, as in the past, provide their own solution affording 
the time needed to bring special weapons and to make necessary changes in organization.”33 
Despite the board’s findings, however, they did not implement these changes. The board 
believed that the success of the division structure in World War I warranted the continuation of 
tactics and policy despite obvious tactical superiority enjoyed by the Germans in the Michael 
Offensive at the end of the war. Confronted with the intransigence of command as well as 
budgetary restrictions imposed by Congress, the Army faced a deplorable shortage of weaponry. 
New weapons were needed, most notably the M1 Garand, 60mm, and 80mm mortars, and a 
105mm howitzer; however, limited funding kept these prototype weapons out of soldiers’ hands 
until the outbreak of the Second World War.
34
  
By 1941, with Europe solidly under control of the Third Reich, and the British fighting 
on alone, the American military realized that war with the Axis Powers was a distinct possibility. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt steeled the nation for the coming struggle and in addressing the 
people on May 27, 1941, he stated, “Your government has the right to expect of all citizens that 
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they take part in the common work of our common defense.”35 It was clear to everyone that the 
United States could not remain neutral indefinitely. Even though the military possessed the 
manpower to fight, it still lacked the training that General Marshall demanded. To train the new 
million-man army, General Marshall chose General Leslie McNair as Chief of Staff of the Army 
General Headquarters (GHQ).
36
 McNair’s task would prove a difficult one; the draft brought in 
hundreds of thousands of raw recruits and each of these men would require extensive training to 
prepare him for combat.
37
  
The GHQ had existed on paper since 1932 when General Douglas MacArthur, then Chief 
of Staff, ordered that the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Armies would be placed under a single 
command for training purposes during a national emergency. These four armies would form the 
basis of the U.S. Army in wartime, with its cadre of officers and men forming the skeleton that 
would shape the formation of the wartime army. The general plan called for the individual Army 
commands to train their own men during peacetime, a policy that was centralized under the GHQ 
in 1940. The plan, which General MacArthur drafted in 1932, would be the one that led the 
United States Army into war in 1941. It called for an eight-step process to bring the army up to 
fighting strength. Initially, existing divisions would be brought up to full strength as quickly as 
possible, followed by inducting the National Guard into Federal Service. After that point, the 
training of the new divisions would be conducted by officers drawn from the divisions already in 
existence, while the men used to create the new divisions would either be volunteers or draftees. 
Following the filling out of the Army, field training would be conducted by the armies created in 
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skeleton form in 1932. Following the implementation of these steps, the GHQ would be activated 
to command the new force.
38
 
As recruits and draftees flooded the ranks of the regular army, training became a major 
problem. Traditional military education could not supply the training necessary to prepare 
American troops to fight overseas. During the interwar years, each branch of the Army 
maintained and used its own training schools. These schools provided professional training, 
developed doctrine and training literature and tested equipment before it became available to the 
troops. They supplied specialized training to the troops in their respective branches, training that 
was augmented by the general Army schools at West Point, the Army Industrial College, the 
Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, and the Army War College in the 
District of Columbia.
39
 While the schools functioned effectively during the interwar period, they 
strained to provide the same services to the huge influx of troops inducted under the Selective 
Service Act.
40
 
Training for the average soldier entering the army in 1940 and 1941 usually began with a 
thirteen-week training program. According to General Marshall, “Trained, disciplined manpower 
is the fundamental requirement of any army. Our training program has been designed to build a 
seasoned body of men who have the basic knowledge and skill to handle any job that may be 
assigned to them.” 41 During basic training, soldiers engaged in physical conditioning, learned 
the basics of military knowledge, as well adhering to rigid discipline and obeying orders from 
superior officers. It was during this time that the new recruits learned basic skills such as map 
reading, proper hygiene, and first aid. Basic training taught essential skills that would serve them 
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throughout their time in the armed forces. In the second half of basic training, infantrymen 
received training in their specialized disciplines. For example, if a soldier received the 
designation of rifleman he would learn to “fire his weapon and to fulfill his role in squad, 
platoon, and company tactics.”42 Indeed, General Marshall’s wanted training that would prepare 
the men, “to act intelligently in an emergency, and that toughen him physically to withstand the 
rigors of modern warfare.”43 
Once initial basic training was complete, the soldiers moved into the combined arms 
phase of their training. Troops only proceeded to this stage once it was determined that they had 
mastered the basics of minor tactics and command skills. This phase of training emphasized the 
performance of soldiers as a part of a division, rather than the small scale unit tactics emphasized 
in basic training. During this phase, “infantry units learned to request, and artillery units to 
deliver, timely and accurate artillery fire. Engineers performed repairs and demolitions for the 
other arms, and supply echelons gained experience in sustaining the combat units.”44 The focus 
of this period of training largely emphasized the importance of the regimental combat team, that 
comprised a regiment and a battalion of artillery reinforcing it. Troops would conduct most of 
this training in the field, learning to fire and maneuver in unison until the unit functioned 
cohesively. During World War I, no unit received further training beyond the combined arms 
phase of divisional training, but this would not be the case during the Second World War. Under 
the tutelage of the GHQ, divisions would be assembled into Corps, and Corps into Armies, 
during the field maneuvers of 1941.
45
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The creation of GHQ officially occurred on 26 July 1940, as the nucleus of the command 
staff came into being. It assumed an intermediary position between the War Department and the 
four field armies then in existence in the continental United States, the 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
, and 4
th
 
Armies, respectively. GHQ’s purview extended beyond these armies as well, giving General 
McNair control over GHQ Aviation, the Armored Force, and all other reserves. Essentially, all 
training initiatives in the continental United States moved from direct control of General 
Marshall to his subordinates at the GHQ, freeing him to serve better in his capacity as Army 
Chief of Staff.
46
 
  General McNair visited a unit in training shortly after assuming command in September 
1940. He remarked, “They were simply at ‘drill’-blind leading the blind.”47 This proved 
especially troublesome for McNair on whose shoulders this burdensome task of training an army 
fell. In simulated battle situations, these men failed to protect ammunition dumps, evacuate 
wounded, use anti-tank guns in proper fashion, and showed a complete lack of understanding of 
mechanized warfare, specifically the use of motor vehicles in combat. To correct these 
deficiencies, the military sped up graduations at the military academies, mobilized reserve 
officers, and authorized small-scale military maneuvers in the Carolinas, Louisiana, and 
Washington for autumn 1940.
48
 General Marshall’s goal was to “enlarge and convert the army 
into a force that could successfully challenge the mobility and mechanization of the German 
army. . ..”49 He possessed a keen awareness, knowing that the value of maneuvers rested with 
their ability to “sharpen the skills of the individual soldier, add interest and drama to training, put 
officers under intense pressure, give good units a chance to flaunt their excellence and expose 
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bad units to merciless scrutiny.”50 These maneuvers would provide numerous opportunities for 
critique and evaluation of all aspects of military operations.  
Initially, GHQ separated the command of corps areas from those of the four field armies, 
but commanders soon realized this to be folly. General McNair emphasized the necessity for 
realism in training that included the organization of the army. Rather than allowing corps to train 
independently inside the United States, they were placed in a hierarchy similar to those that 
would govern theaters of operations overseas. According to McNair, “The establishment of GHQ 
amounts in principle to superimposing a theater of operations on the Zone of Interior.”51 Units 
were organized, trained, and administered in the proper military hierarchy from the Army level 
downwards. Under this plan army officers and soldiers alike received the opportunity to function 
in peacetime as they would in war. Units were to function as they would in the field and execute 
their training with the utmost realism possible.
52
 
McNair’s task as Commander of the GHQ required that he facilitate the training of this 
new army, “GHQ had the twofold task of completing the imperfect training of the forces in being 
and at the same time of using such experience and military skill as these had to train for 
imminent war the mass of units and fresh recruits that were then being mobilized.”53 GHQ 
assumed the task of training all tactical units within the U.S. Army and the responsibility to 
“prepare units to take the field on short notice at existing strength, ready to function effectively 
in combat.”54 This would prove an incredibly difficult task to execute, considering that the Army 
                                                          
50
 Perret, 39.  
51
 Greenfield, et. al., 7.  
52
 Ibid, 7.  
53
 Ibid, 10.  
54
 Ibid, 33.  
28 
 
only possessed three functional infantry divisions at half strength, and six other skeletal 
divisions.
55
  
General McNair emphasized deficiencies to General Marshall shortly after taking 
command of GHQ. His role required him to take over “direct supervision of the huge task of 
organizing and training the field forces within the continental United States.”56 According to 
McNair, initial army maneuvers staged in 1940 indicated that the Army suffered from a plethora 
of problems. The major problems observed during the maneuvers included: “deficient training of 
small units and minor tactics. . .faulty employment of the infantry division and of its combat 
teams. . .failure fully to appreciate the purpose of motor vehicles and exploit their capabilities. . . 
and inadequate reconnaissance and lack of contact between adjacent units.”57 According to Army 
Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, “Basic training culminates in field maneuvers designed to 
weld individuals into seasoned, efficient combat teams and to develop the command leadership 
and staff technique necessary for the handling of large units on the modern battlefield.”58 This 
culminating experience would begin for many men in the field exercises of 1941.   
GHQ policy dictated that units be tested as soon as they completed training. These “tests” 
took the form of maneuvers directed by higher headquarters at the Corps and Army level. 
Through these exercises, McNair and the staff at GHQ hoped to uncover and correct remaining 
deficiencies in the army before it entered the war. One of the first organized activities took place 
at Monterey Bay in California, with the U.S. 1
st
 Infantry “Big Red One” Division staging an 
amphibious assault on the California coast. It was hoped that the field actions would expose the 
rampant deficiencies that plagued the new army. One of the largest deficiencies, McNair noted, 
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rested with the officer corps. McNair fully briefed his officers on the most modern tactics and 
doctrines, but  many proved unable to use the information in the field. In addition to providing a 
proving ground for equipment, upcoming GHQ Maneuvers, such as those in Tennessee, would 
provide a test for the officer corps as well.
59
  
The problem of ineffective leadership was so pervasive that General Benjamin Lear even 
deemed the cleansing of the officer corps to be of greater importance than the lack of modern 
weaponry. General Lear, Commander of the US 2
nd
 Army in Tennessee, stated, “If and when we 
are drawn into war, the people of the United States will insist that the leadership of their sons in 
battle be entrusted only to the most competent commanders of all ranks that we can obtain.”60 
Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall emphasized this point in his commencement address to 
the 1941 graduating Class of William and Mary, stating that an officer’s worth depends upon his 
teaching ability, and that “our greatest problem of preparation involves the matter of teaching.”61 
Educating the officers how best to command would be a moot point if they could not pass on the 
information to the men under their respective commands.  
General McNair wanted to create the best army the United States had ever seen and set 
forth an incredibly detailed training program for achieving this goal. McNair’s plan called for a 
rigid period of training to create a battle ready force capable of protecting the United States. 
Training would begin at the individual level, with soldiers studying combat skills such as map 
reading and combat formations, all the while participating in close order drill to achieve both 
discipline and order. From the individual level, training would then progress to successively 
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larger units up to the Corps and Army level. These steps, McNair believed, were “the foundation 
of military efficiency.”62  
During the Great War, American units received only basic training in the United States 
before deployment overseas. General McNair refused to allow this to occur under his command. 
Under an order issued by him on 4 January 1941, units would receive an additional thirteen to 
sixteen weeks combined training beyond that received during basic training. Once the troops 
learned the basics of warfare, they would test their skills in the field while partaking in combined 
arms exercises. Maneuvers were to be free exercises, with commanders receiving detailed 
objectives that they would achieve through their own methods using all weapons and 
opportunities at his disposal. These exercises would be performed as army maneuvers, 
maneuvers that came to Tennessee in June 1941.
63
 
General Benjamin Lear’s Second Army undertook its first maneuvers in the State of 
Tennessee under the purview of the GHQ. Compared to the previous exercises, the Tennessee 
operation proved unprecedented in scope. The Tennessee Maneuvers would not only test units 
individually, but also as a part of a larger whole. Each division would be required to move, 
coordinate, attack, and defend its position under a unified command for the first time since the 
Great War. The skills practiced in Tennessee, GHQ hoped, would provide the test that the Army 
needed to prepare for the coming conflict.  
 This test would be a shakedown for the new recruits and one of the first field tests for the 
New Army. The first troops assigned to the Tennessee Maneuvers arrived early in spring 1941, 
with the Fifth Infantry Division moving into Lebanon, Tennessee, just off the campus of 
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Cumberland University.
64
  General George S. Patton Jr., commander of the 2
nd
 Armored “Hell on 
Wheels” Division realized the benefits of training in terrain similar to that he witnessed in France 
during the Great War. Tennessee possessed numerous geographical analogues that resembled 
Western Europe in various ways. The Cumberland River presented the same crossing difficulties 
that American GIs would experience in 1944/45 when crossing the Rhine, Tennessee forests 
resembled the Belgian Ardennes where the 101
st
 would spend the Christmas of 1944, and the 
gentle rolling hills resembled the French Vosges.
65
  The terrain was not conducive to mechanized 
warfare, but the Germans had crushed France by fighting through similarly difficult terrain in 
1940. To defeat the Axis, the U.S. Army would not only have to learn to fight, but to fight in 
terrain inhospitable to combat operations.   
One of the first issues confronting the army as it moved into Tennessee revolved around 
logistics. Supply depots were opened in Murfreesboro and Chattanooga, accumulating some 
505,000 rounds of .30 caliber blank rifle ammunition, 9,000 smoke anti-tank mines, 30,000 
dummy anti-tank mines, 120,000 blocks of dummy T.N.T. as well as innumerable food stuffs 
and fuel for the mechanized divisions.
66
 Army directives emphasized that troops not take aid 
from local farmers in order to make their training as accurate as possible. GHQ divided the mock 
campaigns into various Problems, Exercises, and Operations that would provide the structure for 
the maneuvers to operate.
67
 Red and Blue forces would engage in offensive and defensive 
actions against one another; command assigned objectives for each army and umpires remained 
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in place to judge the results of each problem.
68
 Following each exercise, critiques examined the 
flaws of the maneuvers; review sessions sought to examine the successes and failures of the 
exercises, and commanding officers strove to correct deficiencies within their units.
69
 Four 
divisions would participate in the maneuvers: The 5
th
 Infantry Division, the 27
th
 Division (New 
York National Guard), the 30
th
 Division (Tennessee, North & South Carolina, and Georgia 
National Guard), and the 2
nd
 Armored Division.
70
 
The Tennessee Maneuvers, conducted as corps level exercises, served as a proving 
ground to examine the modifications implemented by Generals Marshall and McNair. The value 
of these war games resided within their ability to provide a field test for evaluating officers, 
examining tactics and equipment in the field, and giving the men a realistic simulation of what 
they would experience overseas.
71
 According to Hilliard Wood of the Nashville Banner, “The 
primary objective of the maneuvers will be to test the fighting efficiency of armored troops both 
with and against infantry.”72 Governor Prentice Cooper, a veteran of World War I, while visiting 
Camp Forrest, (then the largest Army facility in the state) compared the troops in Tennessee to 
his compatriots in the Great War, saying that they were “not near so far advanced as the Forrest 
troops.”73 Though the nation was still at peace, simulating war was the only way to examine how 
these changes affected U.S. readiness for war. The war games would test all branches of the 
tactical army, including the air corps, anti-aircraft units, mechanized units, artillery, infantry, 
engineers, cavalry, and units from the chemical warfare service.
74
 During movement into the 
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area, troops were expected to practice cover and concealment as if under threat of air attack. 
Training directives stated, “Never stop thinking about whether or not hostile planes can see 
you.”75 
One of the first issues to arise, even before the maneuvers began, involved the size of the 
armored division. While the infantry division scaled back from its World War I size, the armored 
division remained large and unwieldy, mostly due to the unknowns of armored warfare. When 
the 2
nd
 Armored Division left Fort Benning, Georgia, bound for the maneuver area, its two 
columns stretched for nearly sixty miles.
76
 The 2
nd
 Armored initially comprised of, “three tank 
regiments, two field artillery organizations, an infantry regiment, a reconnaissance battalion, an 
engineer and ordnance, a quartermaster, a medical battalion, and a signal company.”77 
Apparently, Army brass tried to cling to the square division in the composition of the 2
nd
 
Armored. This problem of being overweight never occurred again thanks to the downsizing of 
the division shortly thereafter.  
Phase One of the June 1941 maneuvers involved two and a half weeks of “theoretical” 
combat between infantry units, meaning that all troops would be on the same side and the enemy 
largely existing only on paper.
78
 This first period of action took place under the watchful eye of 
General Frederick H. Smith and his U.S. Seventh Corps. It was during this time that the soldiers 
would have their first field opportunity to test what they had learned in camp and on the drilling 
field. According to the Army, these two weeks were designed to, “illustrate and apply the 
principals of command and staff functioning. Estimation of battle situation, supply and 
communication, principles of night movement, assembly and deployment and daylight attacks, 
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secrecy, surprise, preparation of fire, reconnaissance, and flexibility of defensive action are 
typical of the problems to be studied during this phase of the maneuvers.”79 General Lear’s 
headquarters would act in an observatory capacity during this period, judging the efficiency and 
success of phase one. Following the conclusion of this phase on June 13, General Lear would 
assume personal command and split the 2
nd
 Army into Red and Blue forces for simulated combat 
operations. During this latter period, GHQ command ordered that the maneuvers should be 
conducted to be as real as possible, with sounds and smells created to resemble actual battlefield 
conditions. Commanders were ordered to use “klaxons to simulate battle noises, rattles to 
represent small arms fire, a suspended metal bar struck with a hammer to simulate artillery, 
blank ammunition, smoke puff charges, TNT blocks or appropriate substitutes, and tear gas.”80 
Realism, army commanders believed, would prove vital to the success of the war games.  
This first exercise opened on June 2, 1941, with a theoretical Red Force attempting to 
divide the opposing Blue Force aiming to halt its advance. The first problem required the Blue 
forces to halt the advance, while the second problem called for a counteroffensive designed to 
throw the attacking Red Force back towards Nashville. This first action allowed troops to 
practice “concealment from air observation, movement of artillery and rear-guard actions which 
slow enemy advancement.”81 Over 55,000 men moved into the woodlands of Middle Tennessee, 
attempting to conceal themselves from aerial observation. Every vehicle in the 5
th
, 27
th
, and 30
th
 
Divisions, from 10-ton artillery prime movers, to the new Jeep, had to be hidden in the 
undergrowth.
82
 The units themselves were so well hidden in the woods that signposts had to be 
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erected for the men to locate their units.
83
 Harold Larson of the 5
th
 Division described the 
situation in a letter to home dated June 5, 1941, “I got your nice long letter Tues. boy [sic] I 
don’t see how I got it. I was way back in the woods in an old creek bed. I didn’t know there were 
such wild places outside of Michigan.”84 Cover and concealment were a high priority for the men 
of the 2
nd
 Army.  
The first shooting phases of the exercise surprised everyone, soldier and civilian alike. 
The Red Forces launched a surprise attack on June 2
nd
 with fifty armored scout cars comprising 
the spearhead of a southward thrust, “hypothetical Red forces were in command of Nashville, 
sweeping east through Cookeville, Livingston, Smyrna, and Alexandria, seeking to divide Blue 
forces near Murfreesboro. The 30
th
, 27
th
 and 5
th
 Divisions (Blue Forces under the Command of 
Gen. Smith) moved in darkness and twilight to prepare for the advance and to defend a line 
running approximately from Deason in Bedford County to Big Springs in Rutherford County.”85 
Defending Blue Forces were so startled by machine gunners assailing their positions (with blank 
ammunition), that a Blue Battalion Commander and his adjutant were ruled killed in action after 
their position was overrun by the enemy. Knowing that the 2
nd
 Armored Division was to 
participate in the maneuvers later in the month, division commanders assumed, wrongly, that the 
2
nd
 Armored was preparing a massive strike against Blue Forces. Blue Command responded to 
the shock by placing anti-tank guns, machine gunners, and massed infantry in the streets of 
Shelbyville, Wartrace, and Fairfield to guard vital road junctions, much to the amusement of the 
local population.
86
 Harold Larson recalled the excitement about the impending arrival of the 2
nd
 
Armored Division in a letter dated June 11, 1941, “We are in a farmers pasture today. And are 
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supposed to pull out some time this afternoon. On the 16
th
 of this month, they are going to turn 
loose 800 tanks, boy will we get some excitement then!”87 Though the 2nd Armored had not yet 
arrived, anticipation of their arrival weighed on the minds of enlisted men and officers alike.  
On June 4, 1941, the Blue Army launched a massive counteroffensive to counter the 
attack of the invading Red Army. The 55,000 men of the Second Army launched a pincer 
movement to envelop the opposing forces and turn their flank. According to the Nashville 
Banner, “The Fifth Division, motorized for quick movement, struck north-eastward at the enemy 
flank, while twenty-five miles to the east the Thirtieth Division tried to penetrate the Red front 
for a drive northwestward. The Twenty-seventh Division, completing the Seventh Corps 
defending Blue Army, meanwhile, attempted to engage the enemy in a frontal attack and lend 
assistance to the Fifth Division’s encirclement.”88 The 30th and 27th Divisions succeeded in 
pushing back the Red forces along a 15-mile front by nightfall. The 30
th
 advanced nearly 30 
miles throughout the day, thanks to coordinated artillery and machinegun fire. The 5
th
 Division, 
meanwhile repelled a counterattack by the Red Forces that had been unexpectedly reinforced 
with a unit of fast moving scout cars from Camp Forrest. Throughout the course of the day, 
troops practiced concealment from aerial observation by moving through thick woodland areas 
and successfully evaded detection throughout the attack.
89
 
On June 6
th
, however, the fortunes of war reversed as the Blue forces were placed on the 
defensive during the Third Problem. The theoretical size of the Red Forces compelled the Blue 
Forces to retreat, as they could no longer sustain a counter attack against the overwhelming 
numerical superiority of their fictitious enemy. “The purpose of the action, officers said, was to 
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give the soldiers training in coordination of units, concealment from enemy planes, and rapid 
movement of artillery from emplacements on the retreat gathered speed, and in harassing rear-
guard actions which delays the enemy but avoids pitched battles.”90 The 30th Division pulled 
back within eight miles of Manchester, while the 27
th
 Division withdrew in support.    
By June 9
th
, both Reds and Blues had gained significant experience in attacking and 
retreating in adverse conditions. Their skills were tested yet again during a dangerous nighttime 
withdrawal as the 55,000 men of the 2
nd
 Army began their move under blackout conditions. “The 
retreat, which began in mid-afternoon became more difficult during the night as thousands of 
trucks flipped and turned over narrow dirt roads guided only by ‘blackout lights’ – dim blue light 
that cast no rays to betray convoys to airplane pilots.”91 The movement concluded on June 13 
when the forces again divided into Red and Blue units in preparation for the next Problem. Since 
the maneuvers began, the combat exercises had largely been theoretical, with the actual strength 
of the enemy being determined on paper rather than in the field. The 30
th
 “Old Hickory” 
Division, 153
rd
 Infantry Regiment, and 108
th
 Observation Squadron would comprise one force, 
while the 5
th
 and 27
th
 Divisions would comprise the other. Second Army command declared, 
“The divisions would take turns working with and against the Second Armored ‘Hell on Wheels’ 
Division during the last two weeks of the games to give them training in various tactical 
situations.”92 The second phase of the maneuvers, the arrival of the 2nd Armored Division, would 
test every aspect of their training to date.  
Following the conclusion of the first Phase, umpires and officers evaluated the 
performance of the units. One high-ranking officer, who requested that his name not be used, 
told the Knoxville Journal, “If the troops didn’t learn anything else during the past two weeks, 
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they were impressed with the importance of hiding from the enemy. When the maneuvers first 
started, they would jam the highways so that one well-placed shell would have killed hundreds in 
actual warfare. They would park their vehicles in the open, and wouldn’t bother to put their tents 
under cover nor camouflage their artillery pieces.” He continued, “But as time went on and these 
mistakes were corrected as they were found, it became more and more difficult to spot the 
troops.”93  
These first two weeks were also important as a “field test of such of the Army’s new 
equipment as available and the ability of the men to endure long hours and bruising sweaty 
teamwork.”94 While the umpires and officers debated the outcome, they began to prepare for 
their next task: defeating General George Patton and his “Hell on Wheels” Division.95 The exact 
time of the arrival of the 2
nd
 Armored was a strict secret, so as to test the ability of the infantry 
commanders to counter a surprise armored attack.  
Patton understood that the Tennessee Maneuvers would prove crucial to the development 
of U.S. wartime strategy and tactics. He stated, “I want to bring to the attention of every officer 
here the professional significance which will attach to the success or failure of the 2
nd
 Armored 
Division in the Tennessee Maneuvers . . . There are a large number of officers, some of them in 
high places in our country, who through lack of knowledge as to the capability of an armored 
division are opposed to them. . ..”96 He went further, “Think of this as war . . . that is the only 
chance, men, that you are going to have to practice. The next time, maybe, there will be no 
umpires, and the bullets will be very real.”97 The second half of the June 1941 operation would 
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prove to the army that armor must play a pivotal role in U.S. war strategy. It also proved, 
however, that the infantry still had much to learn in regards to combating armor in the field.  
Patton’s 2nd Armored Division entered the maneuver area on June 15, 1941, and began 
their offensive the next day. According to an AP report, “This is expected to give the Army a 
picture--as true as it can be sketched short of war itself--of how hard and deceptively an armored 
division can hit and the efficiency of present anti-tank defense.”98 The first problem called for 
friendly Red Forces to hold a line against a Blue Force attack, while the 2
nd
 Armored Division 
moved against the Blue forces’ flanks. Patton’s troops attacked from four directions, halting the 
Blue advance and forcing them into a defensive posture.  Armored forces attacked the weak 
points and exploited breakthroughs, rapidly slashing through rear areas to great success. Tankers 
used Nathan Bedford Forrest’s old motto, “Get ‘em skerred and keep ‘em skerred.”99 According 
to Patton, “surprise and fear were armor’s greatest assets.”100  
The 2
nd
 Armored’s first attack, however, proved extremely costly. Though it succeeded in 
achieving its objectives, Patton’s tankers bloodied themselves against heavily entrenched anti-
tank positions established by their infantry opponents.
101
 His tanks mistakenly rushed the 
positions, suffering numerous “casualties” as declared by the officiating umpires. Harold Larson 
wrote of his unit’s experience going up against Patton’s tanks on June 21, 1941, “We went up in 
front of the infintry [sic], and were droped [sic] off them with our 75mm gun on the bend of a 
road. So when tanks came around [sic] the corner we could see them. We had waited about 20 
min or so when here they came there must have been about 50 tanks & armored cars. We got 3 
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tanks & 2 armored cars then the umpire rulled [sic] us out & we were supposed to be dead.”102 
Colonel Marion S. French, Chief Umpire of the maneuvers, stated that the 2
nd
 Armored Division 
had not failed, but that it had merely, “bitten off more than it could chew in calculating such a 
quick and decisive end to its enemy.”103 Though they eventually succeeded in taking the 
position, rulings from the umpires proved unfavorable. Concentrated use of anti-tank guns 
enabled infantry units to possess the firepower necessary to counter any armored thrust that 
dared attack their strongpoints. Only by outflanking the less mobile infantry could the armored 
units manage to rout their opponents. General Lear, providing a statement the following day, 
praised the defending troops who had opposed Patton. He stated, “I am convinced that with the 
use of favorable ground features, an intelligence system which will permit all elements of the 
defending forces to receive immediate and complete warning of an approaching armored force, 
and with suitable weapons to overcome light and medium tanks, our forces the ‘Blues’ will be 
able to give a decidedly fine account of themselves frequently completely breaking up such an 
attack.”104 He went on to praise the tenacity of the armored attack but stressed that there was still 
much to be learned.  
The next exercise tested the ability of armor to turn the tide of battle. Now a part of the 
Blue forces, the 2
nd
 Armored Division sought to break a stalemate between the Blue and Red 
Forces. On June 20
th
, the 67
th
 Armored Regiment attacked through the friendly 30
th
 Infantry “Old 
Hickory” Division, a Tennessee National Guard unit, while the remainder of the unit conducted a 
three-pronged advance towards the city of Manchester. From his staff car, Patton urged his 
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troops on and ended the battle less than four hours after having entered the fray.
105
 Soon 
thereafter, the third exercise provided a further test for what Patton dubbed the “hold em’ in the 
nose and kick em’ in the ass” approach. Red forces would attempt to hold the Blue forces on a 
line from Hillsboro to Tullahoma. GHQ estimated that this exercise would require twenty-four 
hours to complete; however, Patton’s tanks slashed through the enemy lines so quickly, that the 
umpires declared the exercise complete in a little less than three hours.
106
 
The results of the exercises proved the viability of armored and infantry tactics while 
exposing critical flaws that would prove fatal overseas. According to the chief umpire, the 2
nd
 
Armored Division’s actions “were rapid, coordinated, and decisively effective.”107 Patton, 
however, was not so enthusiastic, noting, “It was folly to think of charging antitank guns with 
tanks with the intention of crushing them beneath their tracks.”108 Patton immediately issued new 
directives for his men. Tanks would no longer attack enemy emplacements directly; instead, they 
would exit roads within 1,000 yards of gun emplacements, outflank them, and attack from 
behind. The involvement of armor changed the outcome of battles, “each exercise ended the 
same day that the division entered it, usually twelve to twenty-four hours before the problem was 
scheduled to end.”109 The armored forces of the 2nd Armored Division thoroughly thrashed its 
infantry opponents in the closing days of the maneuvers, clearly evidencing the changes 
necessary to protect infantry divisions from destruction in real warfare.   
Thanks to their experiences in the field, infantrymen and their commanders learned 
valuable lessons that would be vital to the success of the war effort. Their units learned valuable 
lessons, most notably how to combat armored thrusts effectively. When questioned by the press 
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during the early stages of the maneuvers, Commanding General Benjamin Lear remarked, “We 
don’t profess to have a fully trained combat force in the field here. When all the equipment is 
ready, the men will be. Our equipment is incomplete, but I have every confidence that the nation 
will get it to the field armies as rapidly as possible. We have enough for training purposes, but 
not enough to fight with.”110 The information learned through the conducting of the maneuvers 
would prove vital in the coming war.  
Infantry units learned valuable lessons that would protect American troops throughout the 
war. German armored advances destroyed the British and French armies in the field with 
astonishing rapidity in the summer of 1940, but the lessons learned in Tennessee lessened the 
likelihood that the U.S. Army would suffer the same ignominious defeat. Through concentrated 
use of anti-tank weaponry and sound tactical decisions in the field, infantry units could halt an 
armored thrust. Opponents to this would argue that the Battle of Kasserine Pass proved that 
American units were still not up to par with their opponents; however, this argument proves 
unsound. When the American Army engaged the Germans in Tunisia, a near total rout ensued. 
The defeat was not due to the U.S. Army’s strategy and tactics; however, but due instead to the 
lack of implementation thereof. Historian John T. Hoffman claims in his work History of 
Innovation: U.S. Army Adaptation in War and Peace, the US 1
st
 Armored Division that 
participated at Kasserine largely consisted of replacement troops, having received less than five 
months of hurried training and almost no unit exercises.
111
 The troops who had participated in 
the maneuvers back in the states performed far better than their fellow troops and were called 
upon to complete the task that the replacements could not.  
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Without the modernization efforts of men like MacArthur, Craig, and Marshall, the U.S. 
Army would have been woefully ill equipped and under-strength to fight the Second World War. 
The U.S. Army of 1939 could never have defeated the forces of the Axis in open battle, even 
with the improved equipment and larger army outlined by the PMP. The vital link between 
planning and implementation came during the Army Maneuvers of 1941. In Tennessee, the 
thrashing that Patton unleashed on the infantry forced the Army to reevaluate and alter its tactics 
in the field. Infantry units discovered methods for defeating armored thrusts, and mistakes made 
by both sides were corrected before American units reached foreign soil.  
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CHAPTER 3  
“THE DAMN CITY HALL WAS NOT ON THE MAP” 
 During the second phase of the June 1941 Tennessee Maneuvers, General George S. 
Patton Jr.’s 2nd Armored “Hell on Wheels” Division rumbled through the backroads of 
Tennessee, seeking to outflank the opposing “Red” forces of General Frederick H. Smith’s VII 
Corps. Patton’s famous “hold ‘em by the nose and kick ‘em in the pants”112 tactics that would 
win him fame in the European campaigns were put to the test in the rolling hills of the Volunteer 
State. While the US 5
th
 Infantry Division along with the 153
rd
 Infantry Regiment held Smith’s 
VII Corps at the front, Patton’s 2nd Armored would swarm the flanks and defeat the enemy with 
an armored thrust from the city of Cookeville.
113
 During this operation through quiet Tennessee 
towns, one of Patton’s tanks ran into trouble. Whilst trying to avoid crushing a farmer’s truck in 
the town of Bell Buckle, the tank driver took evasive action, leading to the creation of an 
impromptu drive through City Hall. When asked by the press, Patton placed no blame on his tank 
commander, saying, “the damn city hall was not on the map!”114 The army soon discovered that 
the new army going through its paces in Tennessee proved to be a massive improvement from 
the derelict fighting force it replaced; however, it still required further modifications before it 
could challenge Axis forces in Europe and Asia.  
As the first half of the 2
nd
 Army Maneuvers drew to a close, commanders began to 
prepare for the beginning of the second half of the exercises. From the outset of the maneuvers 
on June 2
nd, news of George S. Patton’s 2nd Armored “Hell on Wheels” Division’s arrival tugged 
at the minds of infantry commanders already present in the midstate. Every whisper of a 
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breakthrough, rapid advance, or rapid retreat elicited fears of the arrival of Patton’s tankers. For 
the first time in its martial history, the United States fielded a full armored division in the field. 
The arrival of the 2
nd
 Armored “Hell on Wheels” Division brought a taste of the European War 
to the Tennessee countryside. The soldiers learned to fight the same sort of war that ravaged 
Europe in 1939 and 1940, and the lessons learned in Tennessee ultimately helped bring the U.S. 
Army up to par with its rival nations in World War II. The war games confirmed to army 
commanders that armored warfare would prove decisive in the coming war, showed some army 
commanders were unfit for command, and revealed the outdated tactics of World War I would 
not lead to success in the coming conflict.    
 The war came to Tennessee due in part to its unique geography, as well as concerted 
efforts from state politicians and General Patton. In 1937, Governor Prentice Cooper surveyed 
the situation in Europe in person and upon his return set about improving Tennessee’s 
infrastructure for a possible outbreak of hostilities by constructing a number of new armories and 
weapons depots to supply the Army in a time of war.
115
 With infrastructure in place, and suitable 
military installations throughout the state, Tennessee became the site of the 2
nd
 Army Maneuvers 
in June 1941.
116
 George Patton also spent some of his formative years at his grandmother’s home 
in Watertown and was familiar with the local terrain.
117
 Patton’s intimate knowledge of the 
Western Front in World War I and the similar topography of the Volunteer State also contributed 
greatly to Tennessee receiving the 2
nd
 Army Maneuvers.  
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Tennessee possessed numerous features with analogues similar to that of Western 
Europe. The winding Cumberland River and its numerous tributaries presented similar 
difficulties in crossing that would plague the Allies attempting to traverse the mighty Rhine in 
1944. By practicing crossings of the Cumberland River, the Army Corps of Engineers gained 
valuable experience that they put to use in crossing the Rhine.
118
 The rolling hills and thick 
forests of the state also provided a similar obstacle that would present itself in Western Europe. 
When the Nazis destroyed the French and British Armies in the field, they used rapid armored 
thrusts through the heavily forested Ardennes region of Eastern Belgium, traversing a difficult 
terrain considered unsuitable for armored operations by the Allies. Tennessee possessed such a 
terrain, and if the American Army could duplicate the achievements of the German armored 
thrusts, it could use these same maneuvers against them in the field.
119
 
 In addition to operational considerations, the Tennessee Maneuvers would also provide a 
valuable testing tool in the evaluation of equipment, officers, tactics, and training programs. 
Earlier maneuvers suffered from a deplorable lack of modern equipment, with most weapons 
dating from the First World War, and precious few modern weapons available to troops.
120
 A 
few pieces of experimental prototypes were available to the troops in Tennessee, reflecting the 
efforts of the Army in modernizing its forces; however, numerous shortages and supply issues 
still plagued these maneuvers.
121
  Reflecting the focus on speed and maneuver, one of the newest 
items in the Army’s arsenal received its first field test in Tennessee. Unsure of what to call this 
new contraption, the local press dubbed it “The Blitz Buggy,” although it became known as the 
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Jeep.
122
 Furthermore, this focus on mobility manifested itself in the debate between the infantry 
and cavalry schools of the military regarding the use of armor. During the course of the 
Tennessee Maneuvers, the problems encountered clarified the problems inherent in Army 
doctrines, making the war games of 1941 a vital step in American preparation for war.  
During the winter of 1939/1940, it appeared as though the military would have plenty of 
time to modernize, as the “Phony War” stabilized the situation in Europe. According to General 
Marshall, “Poland had been conquered but the situation in Western Europe was to all intents 
stabilized. There was a feeling by many that the field fortifications established in France and 
Belgium furnished ample security to those nations. Requests for further increases in the armed 
forces of the United States were regarded in many quarters as mere warmongering.”123 Following 
the German Blitz in the spring of 1940, public opinion reversed completely,  
Following the German annihilation of the British and French forces in June 1940, the 
U.S. Congress moved immediately towards massive expansion of the U.S. Military.
124
 The 
crushing blow dealt against the Low Countries and France in 1940 emphasized the need for this 
move. German panzers slashed through the armies of Britain and France, doing what the forces 
of the Kaiser had been unable to do in four years in a little under thirty days. The Germans used 
armor to an effect previously unseen in the annals of warfare. “Spearheading Germany’s 
seemingly invincible military machine was her panzer divisions. These were powerful, mobile 
formations that exemplified the principles of speed, surprise, and shock. Henceforth, any nation 
with pretentions of military greatness must come to terms with mechanization-the large-scale 
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employment of armored fighting vehicles.”125 The rapid defeat of the free countries in Europe 
alarmed many in Washington. This further emphasized the need to move forward with a program 
to modernize the nation’s military. “On May 16, 1940, in a special message to Congress, the 
President recommended the appropriation of approximately $1,000,000,000, of that amount 
$732,000,000, was for equipment and to increase the Army by 28,000 men. . .On May 31, the 
President recommended an additional appropriation of approximately $1,000,000,000.”126 
During this time, the Congress authorized federalizing the National Guard to help bolster the 
ranks of the regular army.  Troops began to pour in to Army camps across the nation, including 
several camps in the State of Tennessee.  
With troops swarming into the nation’s military posts, the army faced another crisis of 
epic proportions. The military equipment necessary to fight the coming war practically did not 
exist. “Virtually every type of equipment was obsolete, or scarce, or both. Guardsmen reported to 
their encampments with World War I tents, webbing, shoes, and blankets in various stages of 
decay. . .A shocked public read about trucks with “TANK” painted on the sides, Springfield 
rifles labeled “.50 CALIBRE,” and simulated anti-tank guns constructed of drainpipe.”127 With 
troops ill equipped to defend the nation, armed with equipment to fight the Kaiser, the United 
States stood on the precipice of annihilation if war were to come to its shores. To correct the 
deficiencies in training, George Marshall assigned General Leslie McNair to the post of Chief of 
Staff, Army General Headquarters (GHQ).
128
 General McNair faced innumerable difficulties in 
coordinating the training operations of this new army, with one of the largest and most difficult 
being the implementation of a standardized, army-wide, training program. “Training had 
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previously been the province of field army commanders. . .McNair, as a staff officer, had only 
indirect authority over the lieutenant generals who commanded the field armies.”129  
The daunting obstacles facing McNair never slowed him down, and his policies 
constructed a military virtually from nothing. According to General Mark Clark, “At GHQ the 
small staff immediately became busy preparing programs that would enable all units to conduct 
their training along similar lines (as the earlier Michigan 2
nd
 Army Maneuvers). Our goal, of 
course, was to integrate and speed up training in order to develop an army for combat in the 
shortest possible time.”130 McNair’s training started with “the individual soldier, progressed to 
integrating individuals into small units, and then turned to training successively larger units 
uniformly, step by step.”131 With the army rapidly expanding, McNair’s training programs would 
prove vital in readying the army for war. As commander of the GHQ, McNair would oversee the 
conduct of all combat maneuvers within the United States, including the Tennessee Maneuvers 
of 1941.  
One of the vital elements of the GHQ mobilization and training program centered on the 
United States’ fledgling Armored Force. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, the 
United States possessed no full armored divisions whatsoever and only a handful of ramshackle 
mechanized brigades. At the end of the Great War, the Armored Corps found itself at odds with 
the old infantry and cavalry officers, much to the chagrin of its champions, the young George S. 
Patton Jr. and Dwight Eisenhower.
132
 According to Geoffrey Perret, “Dwight Eisenhower and 
George S. Patton Jr. nearly wrecked their careers on the rock of high-ranking displeasure.”133 
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Dwight Eisenhower, who would eventually become Supreme Allied Commander in World War 
II, recalled in his memoirs, “I was told that my ideas were not only wrong but dangerous and that 
henceforth I would keep them to myself. Particularly, I was not to publish anything incompatible 
with solid infantry doctrine. If I did, I would be hauled before a court-martial.”134 Patton 
lamented  the destruction of his beloved Tank Corps and withdrew back to his cavalry branch.
135
 
Although armor proved its worth in the waning days of World War I, the intransigence of the 
General Staff stymied development of armor and armored tactics for the next two decades.   
During the interwar years, heated disputes between the infantry and cavalry branches 
resulted in a stagnation in the development of American armor and armored tactics. Both 
branches desired that armor fall under their purview. The 1920 National Defense Act placed 
tanks exclusively under the control of the infantry, removing their wartime independence. This 
comprised one of the factors that drove cavalrymen like Patton out of the Tank Corps. “To the 
infantry generals who ran the Army, tanks and tank believers were upstarts. The only good tank 
was one that rumbled along at two or three miles an hour and supported the infantry.”136 The 
victorious Allies all fell into the same slump, entrusting the control of armor to their infantry 
branches. Marshal Petain stated, “Infantry will in fifty years’ time perhaps be carried in tanks, 
but for the present the tank is an infantry arm working in the midst of infantry.”137 General 
Pershing testified before the House Committee on Military Affairs in 1919 stating, “The Tank 
Corps should not be a large organization; only of sufficient numbers, I should say, to carry on 
investigations and conduct training with the infantry, and I would place it under the infantry as 
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an adjunct of that arm.”138 This misguided doctrine found itself pervasive amongst the Allied 
Powers of the Great War but not so with the defeated Germans. “The irony of the defeat of 
Germany was that her weakness became her strength. By the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was 
forbidden to manufacture tanks. Thus while the Allies were encumbered with thousands of 
obsolete tanks. . .the Germans were free to evolve tank tactics to suit their purposes and later to 
build the tanks to fit them.”139  
American armored development languished during the 1920s until the creation of the 
Experimental Mechanized Force at Camp Meade in July, 1928. “While the official infantry 
position was that tanks were auxiliary weapons to aid the foot soldiers’ advance, a few people 
foresaw mobile war. These spokesmen argued that tanks would be a principal weapon used with 
supporting infantry, artillery and engineers.”140 These visionaries eventually created a force 
dubbed the “Gasoline Brigade” by the press. This unit used equipment leftover from World War 
I, but following numerous mechanical breakdowns during an attempted maneuver in September 
1928 the unit hastily disbanded. Despite its impressive failure, this debacle had not been entirely 
in vain. The experiment persuaded the army to reconsider the concept of armor. The great leap 
for American armor came not from George S. Patton or Dwight Eisenhower, but from Adna 
Romanza Chaffee, later dubbed Father of the Armored Force. As a member of the Army 
Training Section, Chaffee recognized the need for a modern mechanized force. He rejected the 
infantry idea of tying the tank to slow moving infantry and believed that fast moving, light tanks 
should be an independent arm. Chaffee submitted his proposal in writing on December 5, 1928, 
and declared to his wife, “Well, today I turned in a paper at the War Department. When I come 
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back, they’ll either meet me with a brass band, or St. Elizabeth’s funny wagon.”141 As fate would 
have it, the War Department chose the former route, and Chaffee received command of the new 
Mechanized Force.  
The force under Chaffee’s command would be an experiment, much like the “Gasoline 
Brigade,” but with far different results. According to Chaffee, the Armored Force must “operate 
as a combined arms force designed for rapid offensive operations, especially against enemy 
flanks. Rather than support infantry units in breaching prepared positions, armored units would 
exploit such penetrations, moving decisively to crush units in the enemy rear through shock, 
mobility, and firepower.”142 As the country sank into the Great Depression, however, funding for 
this project soon evaporated. Concerted attempts by the infantry to reassert control over the unit 
also chipped away at the independence of the Mechanized Force. The cooperation between 
branches in developing the unit had long since dried up along with its funding. The infantry 
regarded the role and mission of the force as distinctly “un-infantryish,” with the force 
resembling cavalry in character.
143
 Infantry officers claimed jurisdiction over the force under the 
National Defense Act of 1920 and disliked seeing their resources appropriated by any other arm.  
Chaffee recognized the threat to his force, as well as that of the cavalry. According to 
Mildred Gillie, Chaffee realized, “Under the strictures of depression economies in the War 
Department budget, he foresaw its eventual disbandment through lack of funds, and the return of 
the tanks to infantry control.”144 He therefore proposed that control of the Mechanized Force, if it 
must be under the control of one branch, fall under the control of the cavalry with whom it 
shared common philosophies. General MacArthur agreed and assigned the Mechanized Force to 
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the Cavalry Branch. Use of the tank experienced similar difficulties within the cavalry that it had 
experienced under the infantry. Cavalry officers, like George S. Patton, held to a belief that the 
horse cavalry and mechanized force would work side by side. The years since World War I had 
seen Patton revert to his cavalry mindset, and in 1934 he stated that in his opinion, operations 
such as the use of mechanized cavalry independently,  “will be the exception rather than the rule 
and that, in general, mechanized and horse cavalry will operate together.”145 Earlier in 1927, 
however, Patton stated somewhat more favorably, “Tanks are in reality a version of heavy 
cavalry, as that arm was first understood by the first Napoleon. When satisfactory machines are 
available, they should be formed into a separate corps and used . . . for the delivery of the final 
shock in some great battle.”146 Patton’s views largely stemmed from the lack of reliable 
machinery. Patton justified his beliefs by analyzing the infantry/tank combination as having 
failed due to a difference in pace, with cavalry being able to match the speed of armor. 
The attitude of the infantry and horse cavalry advocates proved too much for Chaffee to 
handle. He informed his fellow officers, “They seemed blind to the possibilities of a mechanized 
cavalry, I believe that mechanization and horses will not greatly mix within the cavalry divisions, 
and I believe we have a place for mechanized cavalry brigades, and that they must develop each 
along its own line to carry out the mobile mission of the army.”147 Chaffee could not understand 
why the men of the infantry clung to the antiquated belief that tanks were merely blunt objects 
that could be used to bash the enemy into submission. Furthermore, he could not understand why 
the cavalry would not abandon the horse to the clearly superior mechanized unit. For Chaffee, 
independence could provide the only solution to this conundrum.   
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The debate endured for the remainder of the decade as the infantry and cavalry battled 
back and forth. Each branch attempted to secure control over rights to the military’s limited 
supply of armor. Both arms, however, secured the opportunity to develop armor according to 
their own needs. According to 2d Armored Division historian and veteran Donald Houston, 
“Cavalry mechanization developed along lines that increased mobility, beyond that of horse 
cavalry. The great value of mechanized cavalry, as seen by the War Department, was its ability 
to conduct distant reconnaissance and create initial successes which could form the basis for 
further action by high commands.”148 In regards to the infantry, “mechanization moved along 
lines that would increase the foot soldiers ability to overcome strongly organized resistance . . . 
Most tanks were to be used at that portion of the front where the decisive effort was to be 
made.”149 Compared to the tactics that the Germans would use to great success in conquering 
Europe, American mechanized cavalry units were remarkably similar. During a visit by Col. 
Adolph von Schnell of the German Wehrmacht in 1938, von Schnell remarked that American 
light tanks were faster and more powerful than any in Europe.
150
 Both von Schnell and Chaffee 
realized that combined arms offensives would be required to win the war. When Germany rolled 
over Poland in 1939, American armor advocates were sure they had it right.  
As the Second World War neared, General Marshall devised a method to test which 
branch used armor more effectively. Marshall ordered the infantry’s tankers to fight a mock 
battle against Chaffee’s mechanized cavalry in the swamps of Louisiana in the spring of 1940. 
Chaffee’s outnumbered force used mobility and superior maneuver to thrash the infantry tanks. 
On July 10, 1940, less than three months after this episode, General Marshall created the 
independent Armored Force that Chaffee had advocated for so long, with none other than Adna 
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Chaffee himself as its commanding officer.
151
 The force would initially comprise two armored 
divisions, with George S. Patton Jr., having been an umpire in the Louisiana exercise, eventually 
commanding one of them. The Armored Force had its champion in Adna Chaffee and a devoted 
pupil in George S. Patton.
152
 Though the cavalry minded officers won round one, the infantry 
would seek revenge in the upcoming Tennessee Maneuvers of June 1941.  
Even before the summer 1940 maneuvers, during an informal conference in the basement 
of a high school in Alexandria, Louisiana on May 25, 1940, a meeting of Brigadier General 
Adna Chaffee, Assistant War Department Chief of Staff Frank M. Andrews, Bruce Magruder, 
and Col. George S. Patton Jr. decided that, “an armored force was needed at once.”153 They went 
further, “the far ranging discussion concluded that the present infantry-cavalry mechanization 
concept was inadequate, that time to correct the situation was short and that tankers had so far 
received second-class treatment.”154 Chaffee and Andrews took that decision to Washington, and 
secured the creation of the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Armored Divisions, with the 1
st
 being stationed at Fort 
Knox under Magruder, and the 2
nd
 stationed at Fort Benning under Brigadier General Charles 
Scott. Chaffee would assume command of the I Armored Corps and overall command of the 
independent Armored Force.
155
 
At the outset, the 2
nd
 Armored consisted of 99 officers, and 2,202 enlisted men, with the 
ultimate goal of achieving a complement around 9,389 enlisted personnel with 530 officers 
commanding.
156
 The 2
nd
 Armored Division initially fell under the command of Brigadier General 
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Charles Scott. Scott, an old cavalryman, believed that armor functioned essentially like cavalry. 
According to Scott, “An armored division finds weak spots in enemy defenses, penetrates to the 
rear and then spreads out to cut communications and supply lines . . . A standard operating 
procedure, attempting to cover every situation that an enemy or terrain could present, should not 
be developed. To do so, Scott thought, would result in mental rigidity.”157 Scott proved himself 
as the kind of cavalryman Chaffee liked; he accepted the doctrine of rapid attack and movement, 
without clinging to the horse.  
To Scott, armor should perform the role of a powerful offensive weapon, using surprise 
and maneuver to attack and overwhelm the enemy at the flanks. This is the procedure that Scott’s 
successor, General George S. Patton Jr. would call, “grabbing him by the nose and hitting him in 
the pants,” and would use to great success in World War II.158 Patton, currently commander of 
the 2
nd
 Armored Brigade under Scott, found himself in charge of training for the division, but his 
efforts stymied by a deplorable lack of equipment and materiel. Scott informed Chaffee of these 
shortages and received assurances that the equipment would arrive within six months.
159
 Patton 
wrote to General Pershing upon receiving this assignment, “The whole thing is most interesting 
as most of the tactics have yet to be worked out and there is a great chance for ingenuity and 
leadership.”160 General Marshall also wrote to Patton following his appointment, “I thought it 
would be just the sort of thing you would like to do at the moment. Also, I felt that no one could 
do that particular job better.”161 The chance Patton desired in 1920 to develop armored theory 
had finally been given to him, and he would not squander this second chance.  
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Following Scott’s promotion in November 1940 and Patton’s assumption of overall 
command of the Second Armored Division, Patton set about rectifying major training issues 
within the unit. He recalled a text that he translated as a youngster, “In the winter time, Caesar so 
trained his legions in all that became soldiers and so habituated them in the proper performance 
of their duties, that when in the spring he committed them to battle against the Gauls, it was not 
necessary to give them orders, for they know what to do and how to do it.”162 Patton certainly 
wanted to make his unit the best in the army and sought to bring his old friend Dwight 
Eisenhower into the fold. In a letter responding to Patton’s invitation dated September 17, 1940, 
Eisenhower remarked, “I suppose it’s too much to hope that I could have a regiment in your 
division, because I’m still almost three years away from my colonelcy. But I think I could do a 
damned good job of commanding a regiment.”163 
 Patton’s first major objective attempted to rectify the issues of the Louisiana exercise of 
1940. Critiques determined that inadequate reconnaissance led to unacceptable casualties. Troops 
in the field must fight back against aircraft or hide when possible. Finally, during blackout 
conditions, troops should cover all reflective surfaces while using camouflage to avoid 
detection.
164
 The first divisional training exercise required the 2
nd
 Armored to repel a simulated 
enemy attack on Fort Benning, an attack they successfully repulsed. Patton informed his men 
that they would have to learn how the Germans had crushed Poland and emulate that in their 
doctrine, stressing “You all remember that west Poland sticks into Germany in much same way 
that Brazil protrudes into the Atlantic. To remove this pimple, the Germans used the oldest plan 
in the world. It was invented by the cavemen when they surrounded the mammoth to destroy him 
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. . . a Cannae, a double envelopment.”165 Though the division looked promising, the old 
animosities between the branches soon resurfaced over a trivial matter. During a review of the 
men in September 1940, a General noted the superior look of the tankers in cavalry uniforms, 
offending many infantry officers. Some infantrymen, like Lt. Norris Perkins, took this personally 
noting, “the infantry had developed tanks, while the cavalry was noted for its spit-and-shine, 
impractical and senseless practices based on tradition.”166 This sentiment represented a 
widespread animosity persistent amongst infantry officers.  
With the division slowly coalescing around its officer corps, General Patton determined 
that the unit would undertake its first long distance march in December 1940. The plan called for 
a 600 mile march to Panama City, Florida, that he hoped to use to “perfect march discipline, 
formations and procedures; bivouacs; ground and air reconnaissance; security, control and 
communications; and supply and field maintenance.”167 General Patton reveled in the 
performance of his unit, especially its march discipline. The unit successfully navigated the 
entire route to Panama City, encountering only minor issues. The return trip demonstrated 
another milestone in the development of the armored force, with the 2
nd
 Armored successfully 
executing a night march and simulated attack on Fort Benning with little to no rest. The unit 
easily outperformed the infamous “Gasoline Brigade.” The division soon set about perfecting its 
tactics during the spring of 1941, learning how to coordinate air/ground assaults, traverse rivers, 
and assault and overwhelm opposing infantry divisions. All their preparations would soon be put 
to the ultimate test during the Tennessee Maneuvers of 1941.  
General Marshall had long advocated the use of maneuvers in preparation for war and 
proved a staunch proponent of maneuvers as Army Chief of Staff. In regards to the maneuvers in 
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the southern states, including those upcoming in Tennessee, General Marshall could not have 
been more enthusiastic. In a memorandum to his G-2, dated January 5, 1940, Marshall remarked, 
“These maneuvers present the first training opportunity for the Army in warfare movement 
above the division, and on a fairly realistic basis above the brigade, in the peace-time history of 
the army.”168 He went further, “We have been forced to base almost all of our conclusions, 
regarding the tactical organization, supply and leadership of bodies of troops larger than a 
brigade in warfare movement, on theory or hearsay.”169 Indeed, “major changes in doctrine, 
tactics, logistics, command and control, and combined arms doctrine all emerged from these 
large scale unprecedented field experiments.”170 These tests would provide the information 
necessary to conduct American operations in the field during the Second World War. McNair’s 
task of conducting these exercises would not be easy because “GHQ had the twofold task of 
completing the imperfect training of the forces in being and at the same time of using such 
experience and military skill as these had to train for imminent war the mass of units and fresh 
recruits that were then being mobilized.”171  
To oversee the Tennessee Maneuvers, the U.S. 2
nd
 Army conducted operations on the 
ground. As one of the four field armies, the U.S. 2
nd
 Army received the State of Tennessee as its 
headquarters and area of operations by the GHQ. To command this Army, McNair chose General 
Benjamin Lear as its commanding officer in October 1940. The responsibilities of the 2
nd
 Army 
were great. It “was given responsibility for much of the advanced training required to transform 
many former citizens into soldiers during the World War II years.”172 As one of the four field 
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armies activated under the GHQ, the 2
nd
 Army played a crucial role in training soldiers called up 
in the draft, as well as National Guardsmen and Regular Army troops. During the course of 
World War II, eleven field armies would be created, but only two would remain in the United 
States for the duration, the 2
nd
 and the 4
th
.
173
 From 1940 until 1942, General Lear would carry 
out his duty in exemplary fashion. In the words of General Lear, “We are here to toughen men 
for dirty work.”174 In this capacity, the 2nd Army “would come to be recognized as one of the 
prime builders of American forces.”175 Lear declared in an interview with the Memphis 
Commercial Appeal, “We don’t profess to have a fully trained combat force in the field here. 
When all the equipment is ready, the men will be.”176 The training undertaken in Tennessee 
would perfect the training of American troops in the field and hopefully prepare the men for the 
conflict that was soon to reach American shores.  
Lear demanded nothing short of excellence from the troops under his command. A 
former Olympian, Lear participated as an equestrian and marksman in the 1912 Olympics, and 
served in the 1
st
 Colorado Infantry Volunteers in the Spanish-American War.
177
 In October 1940, 
Lear became a Lieutenant General on the War Department General Staff and received command 
of the 2
nd
 Army less than a month later. Demonstrating his demand for strict military discipline, 
Lear earned the ire of many soldiers and Congressmen due to an incident that occurred just 
outside of Memphis in July 1941. While he was playing a game of golf, a convoy of troops 
returning from maneuvers in Arkansas drove past the golf course. According to reports, some 
soldiers began shouting “Yoo-hoo” and “Hey Baby” to some of the Memphis belles as they 
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drove by. “Adding insult to injury, one soldier, obviously not recognizing the general sans 
uniform, shouted at Lear: “Hey buddy, do you need a caddy?”178 Lear lost his temper.  
The 62-year-old general immediately jumped the fence and ordered the column to stop 
posthaste. He berated the officers for the lack of discipline in the unit, and, as punishment, the 
men received orders to drive back to Memphis and complete the remainder of their march on 
foot. With temperatures near 100 degrees, some troopers succumbed to heat exhaustion, creating 
a publicity nightmare for Lear. When criticized by Congressman Paul Kilday of Texas, Lear 
responded, “I am responsible for training all elements of this army.”179 From this incident, Lear 
earned the nickname General “Yoo-Hoo” Lear, but he also earned the respect of his men. “Later 
in the war, when soldiers were questioned about their combat experiences in the Pacific and 
European theaters, a common response was that it was not harder than the maneuvers in 
Tennessee.”180 
The 2
nd
 Army used an area of Tennessee “stretching from the rolling hills that fringe 
Kentucky’s southern border to the blackjack and pines of North Alabama.”181 The troops who 
trained in Tennessee under the 2
nd
 Army received the benefit of training in terrain that would be 
familiar to them in the battlefields of Europe. The troops “readied for desert combat in the 
choking dust of a Tennessee August or, rubbed hard and raw by January’s sleet and mud 
between Stone’s River and the Cumberland, found the battle ground at Bastogne familiar.”182 
The Second Army’s training program attempted to prepare the troops for the realities of war. 
Until the army could take the field, however, training would be difficult to evaluate.  
                                                          
178
 McMillin, 43.  
179
 McMillin, 42.  
180
 McMillin, 42.  
181
 Sloan, 5.  
182
 Sloan, 5. 
62 
 
When the Second Army began operations in the Volunteer State, it received aid from an 
existing military establishment in Tullahoma, Tennessee. Camp Forrest, named for Confederate 
General Nathan Bedford Forrest, emerged following the passage of the Selective Service Act in 
September 1940 to train the massive influx of new recruits.
183
 By the spring of 1941, Camp 
Forrest became the largest Army camp in the State of Tennessee and a key outpost during the 
upcoming Tennessee Maneuvers. At the outset, however, the troops that swarmed the camp were 
largely civilians in military garb. A common attitude, pervasive amongst the soldiers, proved 
difficult to extinguish, “put in your year with as little trouble as possible and get out so you can 
get on with your life.”184 Their outpost also suffered from the same issues plaguing army camps 
across the country, “Equipment was in short supply and discipline was imperfect, especially 
since officers and non-commissioned officers were less than serious. The food was good and 
regular weekend passes kept life from being too tedious.”185  
Camp training could teach the basics of soldiering but could not come close to preparing 
troops for life in the field. Many of Camp Forrest’s troops deployed to Louisiana and Arkansas 
during the summer of 1941 to practice maneuvering in those states, with the camp serving as a 
base for operations for troops participating in the Tennessee Maneuvers. Governor Prentice 
Cooper visited the camp in May 1941 and described the troops as far more advanced than those 
who had fought in World War I.
186
 General Lear reviewed the Forrest Troops in early June 1941, 
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alongside the granddaughter of General Forrest on Forrest Day, and found himself thoroughly 
impressed by the quality of the troops. 
187
 
According to Hilliard Wood of the Nashville Banner, “The primary objective of the 
maneuvers will be to test the fighting efficiency of armored troops both with and against 
infantry.”188 In the spring of 1941, General Lear issued Training Directive #15, establishing the 
purpose and responsibilities of umpires in the maneuvers, “Maneuvers are the highest form of 
troop training in peace, they can and should approach the conditions of actual warfare more 
closely than does any other type of training.”189 General Mark Clark recalled in his memoirs that 
the importance of the maneuvers rested with giving “commanders a chance to handle large units 
of troops in the field, and McNair wanted to test the soundness of our logistical doctrines in 
large-scale maneuvers, where the men could sleep and live and work as near as possible to 
combat conditions.”190  
For the June 1941 Tennessee Maneuvers, the 2
nd
 Army leased a high school in 
Manchester, Tennessee, just offsite of Camp Forrest.
191
 This exercise would prove to be one of 
the first major tests of the preparations undertaken during the past year, and the problems 
encountered during preparations for the maneuvers proved helpful in correcting deficiencies. 
Logistics became a major headache, with adequate provision of food, fuel, clean drinking water, 
and mail being of great concern. The maneuvers themselves proceeded in the most realistic way 
possible, with live artillery fire, blank rifle ammunition, and dummy anti-tank mines and T.N.T. 
                                                          
187
 Randolph Tucker, “Camp Forrest Stages Colorful Review for Second Army Head,” Nashville Tennessean, June 6, 
1941.  
188
 Hilliard Wood, “83,000 Men Head for Forrest Area to Stage War Maneuvers,” Nashville Banner, May 24, 1941.  
189
 McMillin, 27.  
190
 Clark, 15.  
191
 McMillin, 33.  
64 
 
blocks. Actions between a Red and Blue forces required each side to attempt to outmaneuver and 
defeat the other.  
Both sides received clear objectives but were allowed to devise methods to accomplish 
these goals. The official Umpire Manual, issued by the U.S. Army, indicated that Army 
maneuvers should be free, continuous, and brief.
192
 Units should be free to devise the methods 
that they would use to complete their objectives, while continuing for a period of no more than 
forty-eight hours. By ensuring continuous operation during the course of the exercise, the 
maneuver could achieve its desired level of realism, “an armistice or rest period during a 
maneuver –for example, at night – lessens realism and training value.”193 
To officiate of the maneuvers, umpires would be in place to judge the maneuvers based 
upon a series of pre-determined factors. “These men, all experts in their respective branches of 
service . . . will serve the same purpose as bayonets and bullets.”194 The rules enforced by the 
umpires were set forth in the GHQ Umpire Manual of 1941. The outcome of battles would be 
determined by a series of outcomes as determined by the umpires. “It follows that realism in 
maneuvers can be obtained only by painstaking umpiring of the actions at all points of contact. 
The great mass of umpires should be with or among small units which are or will be in contact 
with the opposing forces.”195 Their rulings were often unpopular with soldiers and commanding 
officers alike leading Patton to issue a cautionary warning to his men, “You will never get 
anywhere if you make them mad. Do what they tell you and do it promptly, and pretty soon you 
will find that they err in shading the decisions in your favor.”196  
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The June 1941 Maneuvers would consist of two “Phases” with the first consisting of 
theoretical infantry action, and the second being a test of the U.S. 2
nd
 Armored Division and the 
effectiveness of the Armored Force.
197
Phase One of the Tennessee Maneuvers officially opened 
on June 2, 1941. Lear emphasized that he desired the maneuvers not be treated as a contest, and 
that this first phase should not be considered maneuvers, “preferring the term ‘exercises,’ stating 
that they were ‘not for the purpose of testing any individual or unit. . .it will be merely a matter 
of teaching the men how to carry out their mission.’”198  
The first phase of the maneuvers fell under the command of General Frederic H. Smith, 
commander of the US VII Corps. These opening exercises of the maneuvers came from General 
Smith and his staff and should “illustrate the principles of command and staff functioning.”199 
These actions largely took the form of practiced marches to meet a fictitious enemy. On June 2
nd
, 
1941, the Blue Force practiced a night march to halt the advance of a simulated Red Force 
advancing on the city of Murfreesboro from the northeast.
200
 The following day, these troops 
launched a simulated pincer counter-offensive against the opposing force.
201
 From June 5-6, the 
Blue Forces staged a pre-planned retreat, focusing on the execution of rapid movement and 
evacuation, as well as evading detection by airborne reconnaissance aircraft. They also received 
extensive practice in rear guard actions and slowing the enemy’s advance.202 General Lear 
offered his insights on the performance of his troops thus far, “The American soldier of today, 
with the training we are giving him, will rank with the best in the world.”203 One of the major 
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purposes of these theoretical actions attempted to perfect divisional cooperation in anticipation of 
the arrival of Patton’s 2nd Armored Division. According to an editorial in the Nashville 
Tennessean, “They will need it to meet the bold, swift tactics of the Second Armored Division 
from Fort Benning, Georgia, which will be thrown into the war games in the third week.”204 
The three divisions participating in the first phase of the maneuvers learned to cooperate 
and coordinate their actions effectively during the first phase of the maneuvers. The rapid retreat 
of the Blue forces ultimately proved successful, with only a few troops losing their way during 
the action.
205
 The troops conducted their retreat in an orderly fashion and managed to evade 
detection through skillful use of camouflage and maneuver.
206
 Anticipation soon began to build 
for the upcoming involvement of the 2
nd
 Armored Division. From Washington, Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson indicated to General Lear that he would like to view the upcoming battles from 
the seat of one of the Army’s new Jeeps, also referred to as a “Blitz Buggy,” or “Army Jack-
Rabbit.”207 
The following week saw a first in the history of Tennessee, a total blackout of the town of 
Shelbyville, as the army simulated an air raid on the troops and the city alike. The 15
th
 Bombing 
Squadron out of Lawson Field, Georgia, simulated an attack on the town, with army trucks 
rolling down the highways under complete blackout conditions. This blackout became a local 
spectacle, with many of the town’s inhabitants sitting on their doorsteps to observe the 
proceedings, while “thousands had packed the sidewalks of the downtown sections. Strikingly, 
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during the blackout, not a voice was heard-everyone was acutely tense.”208 With the first phase 
ending, command of the maneuvers transferred to General Lear. The troops began to prepare for 
the true purpose of the maneuvers, the evaluation of the United States’ progress on creation the 
Armored Force, the evaluation of the U.S. 2
nd
 Armored Division.   
Nothing could have excited the troops, citizens of the state, or the press more than the 
arrival of Patton’s tanks in the state. Since the opening of the maneuvers, the local press had 
been enthralled with the impending arrival of the tanks. Every major state newspaper including 
the Nashville Banner ran articles on a daily basis relating to the 2
nd
 Armored Division. On May 
15, 1941, the Banner ran an article titled “What is the Second Armored Division?”209 They 
pronounced the 2
nd
 Armored as a “lightning-striking little army-a completely mechanized force 
capable of carrying on a small war all alone. All it needs is an enemy.”210 They went further, 
describing the composition of the unit, the equipment, the men, and the commanding officers. 
The Nashville Banner carried an article in May, 1941, declaring, “This grim monster (referring 
to a cover photo of a tank), with sisters in her evil brood, soon will come snarling through the 
quiet glades of Middle Tennessee, whose last experience with striking power, the best in the 
world at that time, was when Nathan Bedford Forrest’s troops swept through, a blend of gray 
shadows and hoofbeats.”211 
Rumors of impending armored attack excited the troops in the maneuver area. Once 
rumors of armored attack reached the units, troops immediately sprang into action. “The heavy 
weapons of the division (27
th
) and its anti-tank guns were wheeled around to meet the threat 
from the rear. So great was the excitement, that many of the commanders were kept so busy that 
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they missed the scheduled critique of the problem they were completing.”212 The rumored power 
of the tank truly created a sense of fear in those opposing it.  
Patton found himself equally excited, although for different reasons. He desired to prove 
to the army that the tank would be the crucial weapon in winning the upcoming war. In an 
address to his men in May 1941, Patton stated, “An armored division is the most powerful 
organization ever devised by the mind of men . . . an armored division is that element of the team 
which carries out the running plays. We straight-arm, and go around, and dodge, and go 
around.”213 He went further, “One of the greatest qualities we have is the ability to produce in 
our enemy the fear of the unknown. Therefore we must always keep moving, do not sit down, do 
not say ‘I have done enough,’ keep on, see what else you can do to raise the devil with the 
enemy. . .”214 The 2nd Armored left Fort Benning on June 14, 1941, and arrived in the maneuver 
area by 6 PM on June 15. “When the Division strikes in Tennessee, it will be the first time in 
United States military history that a full armored division has participated in war maneuvers and 
will be a crucial American defense test.”215 For the press, the stakes in this maneuver were clear, 
“This is expected to give the Army a picture-as true as it can be sketched short of war itself-of 
how hard and deceptively an armored division can hit and the efficiency of present anti-tank 
defense.”216 For Patton, the opportunity that eluded him in 1920 would finally be his.  
Before the action began on the 16
th, Patton’s competitive nature led him to completely 
disregard Lear’s warning not to treat the maneuvers as a contest. He offered a $50.00 bounty to 
each soldier in the unit who captured the commander of the opposing force, General William 
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Haskell, who previously offered a $25.00 bounty to his men for the capture of Patton.
217
 The first 
problem called for a holding action to be staged by the 5
th
 Infantry Division and the 153d 
Infantry Division against a hostile Blue Force, until they could be reinforced by the 2
nd
 Armored 
Division. Patton’s attack tested his “hold em’ by the nose and kick em’ in the pants” theory. 
While the friendly Red Force held the Blue Force on its front, Patton’s tanks would attack on the 
flanks, seeking to overwhelm the defenders and drive enemy force back. The tankers moved into 
position during a night march that the umpires described as “the most magnificent ever made by 
tanks.”218  
The 2
nd
 Armored launched its attack on June 17
th
 and made significant progress despite a 
tenacious anti-tank defense staged by opposing infantry forces. According to a report published 
in the Nashville Tennessean, “a crashing thrust through the Blue Forces by the ‘Hell on Wheels’ 
Division failed to go off on schedule today as the 30
th
 and 27
th
 Divisions threw a stymie in the 
onrush of tanks.”219 Without proper air support, the tank advance suffered unacceptably high 
casualties. The Tennessean quoted Lear as saying, “there is much to fear from a mechanized 
force and that a well-planned attack prepared by heavy aircraft bombardment will be difficult for 
the defense to overcome.”220 After breaking through enemy defenses, Patton and his tankers flew 
down highway 70N, “Shortly after midnight, the tank column with Patton in the lead tank 
enthusiastically waving his pistol, reached the intersection of Highway 10 and whipped into a 90 
degree turn leaving rubber on the pavement.”221 After routing the defenders, the 2nd Armored 
moved through the town of Bell Buckle, where one of Patton’s tankers crashed through the city 
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hall whilst trying to avoid hitting a civilian truck. Patton placed no blame on his men, saying “the 
damned city hall was not on the map.”222 
The lessons of the first problem were extensive on both sides. Infantry units learned how 
to arrange their anti-tank guns to the greatest effect, and the tankers learned how to avoid 
casualties by bypassing the strong points and attacking where the enemy front was weakest. If 
the American tanks could not endure the barrage, they would simply avoid it. General Chaffee 
noted while visiting the battlefield that “the tank used by the United States Army is superior to 
the German tank in mobility, but inferior in firepower.”223 Mobility, Chaffee knew, was the key. 
One problem not anticipated by either side resided within the sheer wonder of armored warfare. 
Many soldiers on the opposing force threw down their weapons upon sighting the enemy tanks, 
not to flee, but to grab their cameras and photograph these mechanized wonders.
224
  
The second problem called for the 2
nd
 Armored to join the Blue Force and launch an 
attack on the Red Forces defending the city of Manchester. Patton’s tankers entered the fray at 
7:00 AM on June 19 and advanced within two miles of their objective by 8:45. From the 
southeast, another element of Patton's 2
nd
 Armored launched an all-out assault on the city of 
Lynchburg, routing the defending forces within an hour. Following the capitulation of the city, 
Patton’s troops followed a messenger plane and captured the opposing commander, General 
Cortland Parker, at 9AM.
225
 A jubilant Patton awarded each man in the unit $25 dollars for their 
achievement. At 11:00 AM, just four hours after having entered the fray, umpires declared the 
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action over, awarding Patton the decisive victory he desired.
226
 The shock of this massive 
onslaught stunned opposing soldiers, “Thank God it’s only maneuvers”227 said Private Robert A. 
Hamlin following the simulated annihilation of his unit, the 165
th
 Infantry Regiment of the 69
th
 
Infantry Division. After suffering nearly 1,000 simulated casualties, the soldiers of the Regiment 
were just glad the mayhem had reached its end. One of the opposing tankers remarked, “I felt 
very near to the real war in the turret of the last tank as the columns fanned out, roaring and 
pitching through field and wood.”228 The desire of Lear and the GHQ to create the feel of war 
had come to fruition. The 2
nd
 Armored flourished in its second problem, annihilating the 
opposing forces with minimal casualties and thoroughly impressing military observers.  
The third problem constituted another test of Patton’s nose-and-pants theory, with the 
66
th
 Armored Regiment launching an attack on the east flank of the Red Forces at 11:00, while 
the 8
th
 Bombardment Squadron launched an air raid on the opposing 5
th
 Infantry Division’s 
headquarters. The flawless execution of the attack led to the 66
th
 Armored reaching its 
restraining line by 12:15. The main assault on the enemy center kicked off at 13:30 and was so 
successful that the enemy center broke, allowing the 2
nd
 Armored to rapidly advance on the Elk 
River. By 14:10, the umpires declared the exercise over, citing the overwhelming successes of 
the 2
nd
 Armored Division. For an exercise estimated to take 24 hours to complete, Patton’s 
tankers required only three.
229
 
During the final maneuver, Secretary of War Henry Stimson visited the maneuvers area 
to observe the “War of Tennessee” for himself. As he had requested weeks earlier, the 2nd Army 
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provided the Secretary with a Jeep from which he could view the games. He commented, a “war 
of movement is much more exciting than static war.”230 He had the opportunity to view a pincer 
attack of 300 armored vehicles against the 27
th
 and 30
th
 Infantry Divisions defending the Elk 
River.
231
 This attack quickly resulted in the end of the final problem in nine hours, rather than the 
prescribed twenty-four.
232
 Thoroughly impressed by the power of the armored division, the 
Secretary congratulated the commanding officers and departed for Washington after lunch.  
The men succeeded due in part to their unorthodox tactics. Through misdirection, false 
information, and unexpected movements, the “Hell on Wheels” Division fully used Forrest’s 
motto of “get em’ skerred and keep em’ skerred.”233 While the tanks had stayed on main roads 
during the earlier problems, they changed their route on the final maneuver, “According to 
Strickland and Tackitt, the tanks and half-tracks roared through forests and over fences and 
fields. Previously the vehicles had largely stayed on the roads, causing little damage.”234 Praise 
of the division followed the conclusion of the maneuvers, with the chief umpire remarking that 
the division’s actions were “rapid, coordinated and decisively effective.”235 However, the 
division also received a fair share of criticism as well, especially the commanding officers. 
According to Lieutenant Colonel Grow, “division headquarters was terrible and control was 
nonexistent because of personality differences . . . the men in the division were fine, but the unit 
got progressively worse up the organizational ladder.”236  
As the maneuvers indicated, the army still had much to do before the military would be 
ready for war; however, the performance of the 2
nd
 Armored Division proved nothing short of 
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exemplary. The 2
nd
 Army issued Training Directive #23 following the completion of the 
Maneuvers on July 11, 1941.
237
 The directive contained the critique of the June Maneuvers in 
two pages.  Major criticisms included deficient combat intelligence, overreliance upon static 
defensive positions, and improper use of motor transport.
238
  
When Lear met with commanding officers to discuss the critique, he was candid in his 
remarks. “During these maneuvers,” Lear remarked, “I carefully watched the behavior of both 
the officers and soldiers in several divisions . . . and I regret to say that our chain of command is 
weak – weak to the extent that if this condition is allowed to continue, the chain, at its weakest 
link will break.”239 Lear especially regarded officers who failed to inform their non-
commissioned officers of operational planning as having failed in their duties. In addition to the 
criticisms, however, great praise emerged regarding the successes of the maneuvers, “It was 
pointed out tank commanders had learned how to avoid anti-tank guns, and to use mortars and 
other weapons to destroy these installations. Some officers, most notably Patton, earned overall 
high marks for their work and initiative.”240 
Another added benefit of the maneuvers resided within the weeding out of the officer 
corps. Lear’s demand for perfection did not stop with the enlisted men. If a commanding officer 
proved incapable of performing his duties, Lear would have him removed. By the end of the 
maneuvers, many high-ranking officers, including two brigadier generals, and two lieutenant 
colonels, were relieved of command.
241
 Others, like George S. Patton Jr. would leave the 
maneuvers only to climb higher in the ranks of the army. Indeed, Patton would lead his 2
nd
 
Armored Division through the Louisiana Maneuvers in late Summer, 1941, and during the 
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invasion of North Africa in 1942 before being promoted to command of the 7
th
 Army during the 
remainder of the North Africa and Sicily Campaigns.  
 Armor proved its viability during the Tennessee Maneuvers and clearly showed the value 
of armored independence. The utter thrashing dealt upon its enemies proved that speed, mobility, 
firepower, and maneuver were the tools necessary to win the war. Patton took personal offense at 
the criticisms levied against him during the maneuvers; he “was not making excuses but rather 
pointing out what I consider to be misconceptions . . . as to the principal functions of an armored 
division.”242 Indeed, Patton took most of the criticisms of the maneuvers personally and 
attributed the division’s losses to outdated conceptions of armored warfare. When criticized by 
umpires for leaving his command post, Patton simply replied, “Were the commander of an 
armored division to sit anywhere with information three hours old, his units might well be 15 to 
25 miles from the point indicated on the map.”243 Patton preferred to command from the front 
and did so throughout the maneuvers. Indeed, Patton’s forward command presence got him 
declared dead on at least one occasion throughout the maneuvers when the umpires stated that he 
had driven through a simulated artillery bombardment. He dismissed this criticism offhand, 
“Hell, you know what’s being shot up in war.”244 Reporters present noted that Patton would 
know, as he was shot up in the last war.  
Though his superiors chastised him for his supposed carelessness, Patton’s men seemed 
to love him for it. As reported by the Knoxville Journal, “He exposes himself to danger as 
casually as a strip teaser does to the front row orchestra. In the first attack of the division against 
the Blue Army here in the wilds of Tennessee it was his tank that was first to hit the road to 
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contact the enemy . . . his soldiers, all of whom respect him as a general who is a man rather than 
as a man who is a general have dubbed him General ‘Flash Gordon’ and ‘the Green Hornet.’”245 
The report goes on to say, “I am convinced that in actual warfare he (Patton) would wear an 
Uncle Sam suit and stick his head out of the tank turret to be sure he was the first to draw 
fire.”246 In a letter written to a personal friend following the maneuvers, he wrote, “You would 
be surprised, at the profound ignorance in higher places as to the use of tanks. People are still 
obsessed with the belief that tanks are invulnerable and try to send them head-on into prepared 
positions.”247 One of the most common critiques levied against the 2nd Armored stated that it did 
not conduct concentrated or mass attacks, harkening back to the massed attacks at Cambrai in 
World War I. Patton regarded this criticism as “the greatest compliment possible.”248 
Since the end of World War I, the development of mechanized divisions in the United 
States Army had been a long and arduous task. Despite numerous setbacks due to funding and 
inter-branch rivalries, the armored branch came of age in the Tennessee Maneuvers. The force 
that Adna Chaffee developed from a poorly funded, experimental unit became the leading force 
of power projection within the United States Army. Without these military maneuvers, it is 
unlikely that armor would have evolved into the branch that it ultimately became. The 
maneuvers proved that, “armor could be used swiftly and decisively with powerful precision . . . 
and that the Cumberland River, a river as swift and wide as the Rhine, could be crossed even 
under adverse weather conditions.”249 The small exercise in Louisiana in 1940 gave the 
independent Armored Force a chance at life, and the Tennessee Maneuvers of 1941 secured a 
long and healthy existence for that branch that continues today.  With the Tennessee Maneuvers 
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at an end, the army prepared to move on to the Louisiana and Carolina Maneuvers scheduled for 
later that year. The citizens of the State of Tennessee, however, were still coping with the effects 
of the maneuvers upon their state. Like the Army that transformed itself inside the state, the 
people of the state also underwent a dramatic transformation.  
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CHAPTER 4  
THE WAR AT HOME 
As military operations unfolded in Tennessee throughout the early days of June 1941, 
they increasingly began to effect the civil population of the state. On June 12, 1941, the city of 
Shelbyville became a focal point of the mock war. Civilians gathered throughout the evening in 
anticipation of a pending air raid by the 15
th
 Bombardment Squadron out of Lawson Field, 
Georgia. The city prepared its residents for this attack in advance, ordering complete blackout 
conditions, which included a ban on smoking cigarettes, cigars, and pipes. Most of Shelbyville’s 
6,500 residents crowded onto the streets to observe the event, with WSM Radio out of Nashville, 
(famously home to the Grand Ole Opry) providing live coverage of the event from the local 
courthouse. The National Broadcasting Company carried WSM’s broadcast of the event 
nationwide, and simultaneous blackouts were in effect in other sections of the country on the 
same evening. As the citizens of Shelbyville watched in awe, the men of the 27
th
 Division moved 
through the town, practicing movement in blackout conditions. Civilians in the town heard the 
echo of machinegun fire as troops guarding the town fired blanks at the aircraft overhead. While 
the reality of war would not reach American shores for another six months, the people of 
Shelbyville and their fellow Tennesseans experienced a near approximation of the coming 
conflict during the summer of 1941.
250
 
Throughout the Tennessee Maneuvers, the United States Military was not the only entity 
occupying the twenty-one counties of the Tennessee Maneuver area. As the men of the 2
nd
 Army 
honed their skills and practiced for war, they began to lay the foundation for the Army that 
would fight its way through the Second World War. The people of the State of Tennessee, 
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meanwhile, tolerated the presence of the troops and sometimes found their presence to be both 
enjoyable and amusing. With the rustic areas of the state turning into a mock battlefield, and an 
influx of resources, men, and most importantly, money, Tennesseans began to embrace the 
presence of this military “invasion.” Soon, men from faraway states like New York, Michigan, 
Ohio began to pour into the mid-state, bringing with them innumerable resources that would 
benefit the people of the state. While the maneuvers sought to affect change upon the military, 
they inadvertently affected the lives of the state’s populace as well.  
From 1941 to 1944, the United States’ Military used Tennessee in an ongoing effort to 
prepare its fighting men for combat overseas. Twenty-one counties across the mid-state 
witnessed the war-games firsthand, with simulated combat taking place under the watchful eyes 
of GHQ as well as the people of the state. Tennesseans attempted to continue their normal 
routines as best they could but found their lives increasingly impacted by the maneuvers in 
numerous ways. Private and municipal property destruction, construction of military 
infrastructure, and the influx of capital from across the country all brought great change to the 
State of Tennessee.
251
  
As the maneuvers began and the military presence in the state increased, so too did their 
impact on the state. According to war correspondent Eugene Sloan, “civilians in the 21-county 
Middle Tennessee area became familiar with equipment and nomenclature. They learned about 
Jeeps, 6x6 trucks, TD’s (tank destroyers) command cars, convoys, pontoon bridges, liaison 
planes and barrack bags.”252 The troops permeated every region of the midstate, digging into 
positions both in rural and urban areas, in farmers’ fields, and sometimes near their houses. 
Whether in the cities, towns, or countryside, the presence of the troops could not go unnoticed. 
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The sheer mass of the 77,000+ troops participating in the maneuvers made everyday contact 
between citizens and soldiers unavoidable.  
During the course of the exercises, it proved inevitable that some property destruction 
would occur.  From farmers’ fences, to state roads and highways, and even one public 
courthouse, many would experience damage in one form or another during the course of the 
maneuvers. As a standing order during the 1941 exercises, property damage was explicitly 
discouraged, so much so that the realism of the maneuvers themselves suffered. In an article 
published in the Nashville Banner on May 28, 1941, the Associated Press reported, “the Army 
went in today for assorted sounds and smells of the battlefield to give its draft Army realistic 
preparation for the first shock of battle.”253 They continued, “Personnel will be subjected for the 
first time to the shock of hostile fire and to the nerve-wracking sights and sounds of combat.”254 
With directives like this in hand, the Army attempted to recreate the battlefield as realistically as 
possible. However, worries over the destruction of property seemed to take precedence in the 
June 1941 maneuvers. Army commanders earnestly sought to avoid destroying civilian property 
to preserve good will between the Army and the indigenous population. Before the maneuvers 
began, the Army sent representatives across the maneuver area to survey the proposed maneuver 
site. They covered nearly 600 square miles and met with all landowners in the area to receive 
permission to use their land.
255
 
One of the major critiques of the June 1941 maneuvers expressed concern regarding the 
excessive loss of tanks in the 2
nd
 Armored Division. Some losses, however, were not the fault of 
military tactics or strategy, but rather the policy regarding destruction of property. Rather than 
bulldozing through farmers’ fences and pastures, tankers were instead ordered to use gates. 
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Training directive #14, issued on June 14, 1941, gave three explicit orders regarding the cutting 
of fences. According to the directive, “When necessary to cut or remove fences, the following 
rules will be observed: A. No more fencing will be opened than is necessary to accommodate the 
passage of the troops. B. A guard will be stationed at the fence opening to prevent the escape of 
stock. C. The cut or opened fence will not be repaired by the unit cutting or opening the fence. 
Material (not tools) required will be available at the Army Engineer Depot.”256 Tankers would 
lose valuable time avoiding farmers’ fences and dismounting tanks to open and close gates as 
they passed through the area. Soldiers who did not properly close gates allowing livestock to 
escape were often reprimanded for their carelessness.
257
  
The order to avoid unnecessary destruction of property clearly influenced the outcome of 
several engagements but did succeed in protecting the integrity of farmers’ property on 
numerous occasions. Henry McLemore recalled one such instance in his column for the 
Knoxville Journal, “I saw tanks plunge recklessly through almost impenetrable woods to come 
suddenly to a halt while the assistant driver carefully opened a cow pasture gate in order to avoid 
damaging personal property. This meticulous procedure was often watched by the ‘enemy’ 
sometimes no more than 75 yards away.”258 He continued, “Then, when the gate was closed and 
the tanks charged again, the damnedest argument would set in. The enemy would claim the tanks 
were out of commission, having been destroyed while the gate was being opened. The tank 
crews would say it wasn’t fair to shoot while they were opening the gates. Then they would all 
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relax and wait for an umpire to happen along and the umpires sometimes don’t happen along for 
several hours.”259  
When property damage did occur, however, the Army provided a streamlined process for 
locals to file claims with the Army for reimbursement, with pre-addressed postcards being sent 
to landowners within the maneuver area. Landowners would fill out the cards and return them to 
the Army. If they had sustained damage during the maneuvers, the Army would evaluate the 
claim and reimburse the claimants for the damage.
260
 In future maneuvers, increased concerns 
regarding property destruction due to the larger size of the maneuvers led to a change in this 
process, where the Army would send its own forces to repair private property immediately after 
it was destroyed in action.  
Tanks initially kept to the roads as per their orders, but the sheer mass of men and 
materiel created great interest among the people of the state. According to an article written by 
Randolph Tucker in the Nashville Tennessean, “Middle Tennesseans had their chance to see and 
hear the tanks sweep through the countryside, and it was a sleepless night for many as the 350-
horsepower airplane motors roared along. Town squares were packed with spectators who 
strained inquisitive eyes on the scene, new not only to Tennesseans, but to all Americans since 
this is the first practice of the nation’s ‘Hell on Wheels’ blitz babies.”261 The tanks were a source 
of great interest to the public as well as the infantrymen, as neither had witnessed previously an 
armored attack. Indeed, soldiers and civilians alike found themselves awestruck by the sheer 
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sight of the onrush of tanks, prompting soldiers to drop their guns and pick up their cameras, 
while civilians looked on with awe.
262
 
With the sheer mass of men and materiel using Tennessee’s limited infrastructure, it 
became inevitable that damage would be done to antiquated roads and highways. On June 17, 
1941, one such incident involved one of George Patton’s light tanks of the 2d Armored Division. 
The tank crashed through a steel and concrete bridge near Alexandria, Tennessee, taking thirty-
five feet of the span with it while plunging twenty-five feet into Smith Fork Creek. The driver 
suffered a broken leg, and the remainder of the division was forced to find an alternate route, as 
it took several days to repair the bridge.
263
 Crashes like this one proved commonplace throughout 
the maneuvers. On the same day, another tank driven by Private Melvin L. Mills and Private 
Walter C. Pittman crashed through another bridge near Liberty, Tennessee, plummeting thirty 
feet and severely injuring Pittman.
264
 Another incident occurred when a tank from the 66
th
 
Armored regiment crashed through a bridge railing under blackout conditions, destroying the 
tank and severely injuring the driver.
265
 
During the third problem, another tank from the 66
th
 Armored Regiment managed to fall 
eight feet off a wooden bridge. With the tank immobilized, curious locals emerged to survey the 
situation. With help miles away, the locals attempted to devise various methods to pull the tank 
out of the gulley. One man offered to use his mule team to extract the tank from its resting place, 
while another man suggested towing it using his Model A Ford. While stranded, 2
nd
 Lieutenant 
Joe Moore, commander of the stricken tank, began to eat his emergency rations while waiting for 
aid. With the swarm of locals at the crash site growing, a local woman decided to treat the tank 
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crew with genuine Southern hospitality, providing a platter of biscuits, butter, honey, and a pot 
of coffee. The experience proved memorable for the tank crew and locals alike.
266
  
Most famously, however, one of Patton’s tanks caused significant damage when it took 
evasive action to avoid crushing a farmer’s truck in the town of Bell Buckle, Tennessee. The 
tank driver managed to avoid hitting the truck but instead drove straight through city hall. The 
tank plowed through the wall, causing one side of the building to collapse on top of the steel 
monster. It took several hours to clear the debris before the tank could reverse and rejoin the 
action.
267
 Besides the building, the only casualty came from the turret gunner whose, “helmeted 
head stopped a falling brick.”268 Bell Buckle’s city hall sustained some of the heaviest damage of 
any public building during the maneuvers. The road system, however, suffered extensive 
damages due to the numerous tank accidents as well as normal wear and tear. Tennessee 
Highway Commissioner C.W. Phillips calculated initial damages to Tennessee roads and 
highways at $18,987.50. This estimate only covered state owned property, as county and city 
officials filed separate statements. 
269
 
Damage to property, however, was not limited to civilian and municipal interests. One 
problem that persistently annoyed the military involved the destruction of their lines of 
communication. The lines were not cut by enemy combatants or careless civilians but by the 
livestock adjoining the headquarters of units such as the 53
rd
 Infantry Brigade in Shelbyville. 
According to Sgt. Francis Gardner of Schenectady, New York lamented, “I don’t know what 
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there is about our wires that the cows like.”270 The cows found the insulation of the phone lines 
to be rather appetizing and kept the wire crews busy replacing lines throughout the maneuvers.  
Problems persisted in the area of traffic control as well. Rather than ceding the right of 
way to military vehicles, civilians and military personnel shared the roads on several occasions, 
resulting in congestion and slowed advances. In an article published on June 7, 1941 in the 
Nashville Banner, Associated Press Correspondent Hilliard Wood writes, “As the unsuspecting 
motorist passes this flag on a southward journey he fills the sight of a Blue 50-caliber anti-tank 
mechanized gun hidden in the rank undergrowth of an untended fence row. The gun crew won’t 
shoot him, but just over the hill he will get into one of the largest masses of motorized 
equipment, trucks, weapon carriers, and command cars he will ever hope to get out of.”271 In 
most cases, however, corridors were shut off to civilian access for their protection as well as 
operational considerations. Officers reported to command that, “civilian traffic has been no 
deterrent to the shuttling motorized columns.”272  
Civilians, however, reported great consternation while trying to reach areas impacted by 
the maneuver zones. According to an Army report published in the Chattanooga Times, 
“Tactically, officers say the soldiers have yet to find any great civilian problem enmeshing the 
widespread army movements.”273 Military Police and local authorities managed to close off most 
arteries to prevent civilian traffic from entering the war zone. Stories such as these were all too 
common as civilians and military personnel alike inhabited the same areas of the state. While one 
was training for war, the other was merely going about their daily lives.  
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Newspapers were responsible for announcing road closures to the public and advising 
alternate routes and possible viewing opportunities of the maneuvers themselves. With many 
roads occupied by Army equipment, the Nashville Banner ran an advisory article suggesting 
alternate routes between Nashville and Chattanooga. According to the paper, “The traffic 
problem has become more acute in the war maneuver area between Nashville and Chattanooga 
with the closing of the Manchester-Monteagle span of road for improvements along U.S. 
Highway No. 41. However, the motorist, if he desires to see the Army in action, may take the 
Murfreesboro-Manchester-Tullahoma-Winchester route of 161 miles to Chattanooga.”274 Many 
civilians took advantage of the opportunity to witness the war games for themselves.  
In many instances, civilians did not have to travel to witness the maneuvers. Fast moving 
advances and retreats, field encampments, and defensive positions placed many troops in close 
contact with local citizens. One such case involved local farmer Earl Warren of Coffee County, 
Tennessee. Warren’s 145-acre farm found itself repeatedly overrun by Red and Blue Forces 
battling back and forth throughout the maneuvers. Though he admitted some frustration with the 
Army, he found their presence to be a welcome diversion. His interview with Hilliard Wood of 
the Associated Press provides an excellent account of a farmer caught up in the middle of the 
action. “Those soldiers,” Warren said, “they’re as nice a bunch of fellows as I ever met.”275 Mr. 
Warren reported enjoying having conversations with the men on his farm as he harvested his 
crops, claiming it to be a good diversion from a hard day’s work. He expressed frustration 
following the destruction of his orchard, however, “I do think they might have been more careful 
with their trucks around the fruit trees but this was just one bunch of them. Most of them are all 
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right. I complained to the captain and he told me that the Government would pay for the orchard 
but you know it’s hard to tell when a thing like that has been paid for.”276  
Mr. Warren also reported on numerous guests that visited his house while the Army was 
camped nearby. “I guess my wife feeds more than 200 of them. The first night they came here 
she stayed up till 1 o’clock cooking and then she wanted to wash the dishes before she went to 
bed . . . She fed about forty more the next day. You know they all seem to want ham and eggs.” 
He continued, “We charge most of them but a couple of soldiers were in the other night whose 
home is just about two miles away and offered to pay for their meal. You know I couldn’t charge 
those boys anything. I’ve got two sons who are signed up for the draft, one of them received his 
questionnaire just last Saturday. I’d hate to think they couldn’t go to my neighbor’s house if they 
were hungry and get something to eat.”277 Warren enjoyed having the troops around and stated 
that their damage to his property, minus the orchard, was minimal, although they did leave his 
gates open regularly, allowing his cattle to escape. He chuckled recalling some of the questions 
the men asked, which mostly revolved around operating the farm. Many of them had never been 
to the country before and were highly inquisitive regarding farm operations.  
Like Mr. Warren, James Clemons of Granville, Tennessee recalled his frustration with 
escaping livestock caused by the maneuvers. He recalls, “It was frustrating chasing hogs and 
cows all over the place. About the time you’d get them back where they belonged, another Army 
unit would come through and tear the fence down again and off they’d go. And off I’d go 
chasing after them.” He continued, “We all knew it was for a good cause, and everyone got along 
really well. When we’d get the cows back, the soldiers would love to watch us milk them. Many 
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of the soldiers had never seen a cow milked before so it was great entertainment.”278 Like James 
Clemons and Earl Warren, many Tennesseans experienced discomforts associated with the close 
proximity of Army units but tolerated them with a gentle good humor as they understood the 
purpose of their presence.  
Not all troops visited the locals willingly. It was common practice for “prisoners of war” 
to be detained on local farms. Privates Cecil Ray and Milton White enjoyed the hospitality of 
their hosts after being captured during the maneuvers. “As prisoners of the ‘blue’ army these 
soldiers enjoyed their period of captivity probably more than they would during actual warfare, 
for the owners of the farmhouse where they were detained treated them with candy and 
lemonade.”279 Many POWs enjoyed their brief stays in captivity, especially considering the 
hospitality of their captors.  
Indeed, whether at work or play, the troops influenced the lives of civilians. “On week-
ends, after a siren in a Piper Cub sounded the end of a problem, streets were crowded in every 
town in the area. Soda fountains, movie houses, and USO recreation centers were packed.”280 
Interactions between soldiers and civilians often became a point of contention between the two 
sides but also offered numerous opportunities for businesses in the state. Local businessmen 
would capitalize on the needs of the soldiers, from selling merchandise in stores, produce/meals 
from farmers, to patronage bestowed upon local establishments during limited leave time.  
With nearly 80,000 troops inhabiting the state during the maneuvers, it soon became 
apparent that their presence would be a boon for businesses of all sorts throughout the month of 
June. Many local citizens took advantage of the opportunities presented by the sheer mass of new 
consumers in the area. Nine year old Loyd Johnson of Beech Grove, Tennessee, started his own 
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courier business. With nothing but a pushcart, Loyd purchased candy bars for a nickel apiece and 
sold them to the troops for a quarter. He excitedly told a local reporter, “I’ve got more nickels 
and dimes than I ever had before. I sure like the soldier boys. See, I’ve got a flag and a pistol on 
my cart!”281 Johnson made a healthy profit during the 1941 maneuvers, and continued his 
success with later maneuvers.  
Another boy, Jack Cato, one of the future founders of the Cracker Barrel Restaurant 
chain, also partook in this lucrative trade. He recalls, “I used to buy candy bars and soft drinks 
for a nickel, and the soldiers would pay me a dime for them, sometimes a quarter. They were 
glad to get them, and I suspect they felt good about helping a kid make a little money. . .By the 
time the maneuvers finished, I had a better appreciation for business , and for soldiers who 
sacrificed so much.”282 Like Jack and Loyd, many local boys found the troops to be a good way 
to make a little money.  
Not all business success was limited to amateurs, however, as local shopkeepers recorded 
record profits. Dee Baker, a Manchester druggist reported, “One day alone we sold more than 
400 milk shakes. We would have sold more if we could have got milk. And ice cream cones-
plenty of times I never wanted to see a dipper again. Soap, I never knew there was so much soap. 
Why, I sold it faster than I could get it!”283 He continued, “I’d have sold $1,000 worth of mirrors 
if I could have got them in. Boy, the rush was nearly too much. If they have maneuvers here 
again this store is going to be widened 20 feet. They couldn’t all get in.”284 Baker claimed to 
have sold more ice cream in one week during the maneuvers than he did any month in 1940. 
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Local businesses made a handsome profit from the presence of the troops throughout their time 
in the region. 
Businesses in every area of the warzone boomed with the patronage of thousands of 
troops. According to Jerry Baulch of the Associated Press, “Every one of the dozen or so towns 
and villages-the largest had a 7,000 population-in the maneuver area saw its streets filled almost 
nightly throughout June with fun-hunting soldiers. Most of the stores in the villages and along 
the roadsides had sold out many times their stock of refreshments, candies, and tobacco. Some of 
them did as much business one day as they ordinarily do in an entire year.”285 The presence of 
the troops provided a huge boost to local economies. The local economy thrived on the presence 
of the soldiers. With around 80,000 present during the maneuvers, 120,000 stationed at Camp 
Forrest, 10,000 at the Smyrna Airfield, and 14,000 at the Army Air Force Classification Center 
in Nashville, Tennessee was in an ideal position to capitalize on the needs of the soldiers. The 
maneuvers, coupled with the presence of large numbers of soldiers stationed around the region 
propelled the economy of the state to heights not seen since the beginning of the Great 
Depression.
286
 
On the last weekend of May, the city of Nashville saw nearly 4,000 soldiers stream into 
the city for their last weekend break until the end of combat actions. The city was not entirely 
prepared for the influx, as civic organizations had not planned activities to entertain the soldiers. 
However, they entertained themselves by exploring the city, visiting move theaters and dance 
halls, taverns, and restaurants. Rooms in hotels, however, soon ran out. Many soldiers ended up 
sleeping all over the city, “it was estimated that more than 1,000 were sleeping on lawns all over 
the downtown section-Memorial Square, at the post office, the Customs House, Hume-Fogg 
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Technical School, the Nashville Public Library, and some 200 were said to have covered the 
lawn in front of the Polk Apartments on Seventh Avenue, North.”287 The Nashville police also 
reported that at least 41 soldiers spent the night as their guests on charges of drunk and 
disorderly conduct.  
 Thanks to an Army Chaplain of the 115
th
 Field Artillery, some troops and locals were 
able to view movies courtesy of the Army. He “set up the movie projector on his jeep to give 
troops a respite from the action.”288 Inviting the locals to attend his shows helped to engender 
good feelings between the Army and the civilians as well. According to Lucy Stoner of Wilson 
County, Tennessee, “One Sunday night, they were camped next to the Greenvale Cemetery, not 
far from our house. They invited all of us in the area over to see a movie. My father and I went, 
along with my two sisters. I don’t remember the movie, but I’ll always remember that night. We 
all had a good time and everyone was very friendly. We got to know some soldiers really 
well.”289 Though this was done on an ad hoc basis during the 1941 maneuvers, the USO would 
continue the process during later actions.  
If the June maneuvers proved anything to locals and military officials alike, it was that 
recreational opportunities for troops stationed in the state were sorely lacking, and that troops 
needed diversion during downtime. It was with this in mind that the Second Army created the 
Community Services and Recreational Activity Program to oversee recreational activities for the 
soldiers. Executive Order No. 8890 established the Office of Defense Health and Welfare 
Services to meet the needs of communities arising from the defense program and to coordinate 
the activities of service organizations during emergencies. The Recreation Section of the 
program “was responsible for stimulating and coordinating recreational programs in 
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communities of the Tennessee Army Maneuver Area and assisting such communities to secure 
supplementary recreational facilities.”290 These facilities could include anything from a 
swimming pool, officer/enlisted lounges, formal and informal dances (including square dances), 
United Service Organization (USO) movies and shows, as well as shower and bath facilities 
should the troops require them.
291
 However, these changes would not be implemented until the 
1942 maneuvers at the earliest, and the soldiers of the June 1941 maneuvers had to make do with 
what they had.  
Not all R&R (rest and relaxation) took place in the cities of the state, however, as many 
soldiers decided to spend their time in the country. Nearly 24,000 soldiers took Greyhound buses 
into the country during the first week of the month. New York Times Correspondent Hanson W. 
Baldwin penned an article on June 23
rd
 detailing the exploits of the 27
th
 Division (New York 
National Guard) interacting with the locals at a local dance. According to Baldwin, “They played 
‘Turkey in the Straw’ and Uncle Charley did the calling. The hill-billy band sat in the front of  
what used to be Jim Bean’s law office and the music of the fiddle and the plunking strings was 
carried to Lynchburg through loud-speakers atop the dry goods emporium.”292 He continued, “It 
was one of the biggest nights in Tennessee hill country history as Lynchburg, population 390 at 
the last census, entertained those 18,000 ‘damyankees’ (it’s all one word down here) of New 
York’s Twenty-Seventh Division at an old-fashioned square dance in the village square last 
night.”293  The men of the 27th reveled in the rustic nature of their hosts and laughed at the 
“whooping and hollering” exhibited by their newfound friends.  
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Though Lynchburg enjoyed the presence of the soldiers on this occasion, not all 
communities were as thrilled at the sudden influx of guests. Towns that had small populations 
soon found themselves overrun with the khaki clad troops, “In their rest hours, soldiers have 
been overrunning restaurants and stores, sometimes exhausting stocks within a few hours. Tents 
have been pitched on farmers’ doorsteps, guns set up in main streets.”294 Even Chattanooga, one 
of the largest cities in the state, found its facilities taxed by the massive influx of visitors to the 
city with 10-15,000 men swamping the city from Camp Forrest and Fort Oglethorpe. Hotels ran 
out of rooms, restaurants ran out of food, and stores ran out of stock and supply. A Service 
Men’s Club was set up by the city to aid in accommodating these men, and the local YMCA set 
up 125 cots to help with overcrowding.
295
 Despite their best efforts however, the ad hoc 
measures taken during the 1941 maneuvers could not accommodate the massive influx of troops. 
Only the creation of the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services following the maneuvers 
would allow for the creation of adequate recreation and rest facilities for G.I.’s in the midstate. 
These changes, however, would come too late for the 1941 exercises. 
The massive influx of troops proved to bring both positive and negative effects to the 
state of Tennessee during the short duration of the 1941 Maneuvers. From traffic disruptions to 
property destruction, from economic boom to overwhelming local establishments, the 1941 
maneuvers had a huge impact on the state and its populace. Like the effects of the maneuvers on 
the military itself, the maneuvers affected profound changes on the indigenous people of the 
state. Beginning in 1941 and continuing until the termination of the maneuvers in 1944, the 
presence of hundreds of thousands of American troops drastically changed the economic and 
social makeup of Tennessee. Men from across the country converged on the midstate, bringing 
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with them different customs and perspectives. Their Army paychecks provided a well needed 
boost to the state’s economy, with local merchants often struggling to keep merchandise on their 
shelves when the troops came to town. They created a market for consumer goods, providing the 
impetus for children and adults alike to capitalize on their needs. As J.M. McCullough of Coffee 
County stated, “I’m sorry they’re leaving because we never had a show around here like this 
before. They were fine looking boys and sure did themselves up proud. When they were camping 
on my property, I told them to take the last drop of water out of my well if they wanted it. They 
all treated us nice too.”296 Like McCullough, many Tennesseans found themselves saddened by 
the departure of the troops but eagerly looking forward to their eventual return. Though their 
presence could sometimes be an irritant, their contributions endeared them to the local populace 
and far outweighed the negative aspects of their occupation. 
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
 While the June 1941 Tennessee Maneuvers were eclipsed in the months following its 
conclusion by larger successors in Louisiana and the Carolinas, the contributions of the war 
games cannot be discounted. Numerous interwar developments and modifications in both the 
infantry and armored branches of the U.S. Army found themselves put to the test in the fields of 
middle Tennessee. The infantry branch made the switch from the square to the triangular 
division structure in the years preceding the maneuvers but only received extensive field-testing 
of this configuration on a mass scale for the first time in the June 1941 maneuvers. Likewise, the 
arduous struggle to create an independent armored branch led to a massive developmental delay 
in U.S. armor and armored tactics. The theoretical ideas and concepts surrounding the armored 
division appeared to indicate success on paper but could not be evaluated critically until the 
theories were put to the test in the field. The Tennessee actions proved to many in the armed 
forces that the units taking the field in Tennessee were a huge improvement from the forces that 
had existed during the interwar period but still required extensive modifications to prepare 
themselves for the looming conflict. 
 The military was not the only entity to benefit from the effects of the maneuvers, 
however, as local Tennesseans found their lives dramatically changed by the presence of the U.S. 
Army in their state.  The citizens may have been apprehensive about the military “invasion” at 
first, but soon discovered that the benefits of their presence far outweighed the costs. Many 
understood the purpose of these actions and realized the importance attached to the maneuvers 
by the military. They endured nearly a month of mock-war in which the front lines snaked their 
way across farms, roads, and even town squares. Local businesses took advantage of the 
presence of the soldiers, making record profits in numerous lines of business. Indeed, even local 
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children found the entrepreneurial spirit too much to resist and carried wagonloads of candy, 
drinks, and other assorted items to the troops in return for an oftentimes 100-200% return on 
their investment. Though some property damage did occur, most Tennesseans were willing to 
excuse the inconveniences. Indeed, many found the presence of the troops to be a source of great 
excitement, and an amicable local populace made civil/military relations much easier.  
 This thesis provides a critical study of the 1941 maneuvers as well as the prewar 
developments that necessitated them. It fills a void in the study of prewar preparation, covering 
an often-overlooked exercise that was of immense importance to the United States Military in its 
preparations for the Second World War. The Tennessee Maneuvers were critical in the 
development of both infantry and armored doctrine that the Army would take into the field 
following the outbreak of war in December 1941. Prior to the maneuvers, no U.S. force had 
engaged armor in the field since the Great War, and indeed, no U.S. Armored Division had ever 
taken the field prior to the June 1941 Maneuvers.  
Though later Louisiana and Carolina Maneuvers of the same year would eclipse the 
Tennessee Maneuvers in both size and scope, the Tennessee actions provided the first glimpse of 
how the U.S. Army would function in a modern war. The 1941 maneuvers taught the infantry 
how to combat concentrated armored thrusts successfully by demonstrating the effectiveness of 
concentrated anti-tank positions. Moreover, it taught the Army how to use its armored forces 
effectively in the field. General Patton’s first attack in Tennessee demonstrated the effectiveness 
of the infantry’s massed anti-tank defense tactics, but his further attacks demonstrated the true 
striking power of the Armored Force. The excessive “casualties” sustained during the first attack 
led Patton to change his methods. Rather than charging headlong at strongly defended positions, 
his men would strike at the flanks, while friendly infantry forces would hold the enemy’s 
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attention at the center. By crushing the enemy flanks, the 2nd Armored Division could slash 
through rear areas and wreak havoc on the enemy. This method would become the prescribed 
method of armored warfare implemented during later maneuvers and throughout the duration of 
the Second World War.  
The critiques of the war games clearly evidenced the changes that would be necessary to 
correct deficiencies discovered throughout the maneuver period. Deficiencies in small-unit 
leadership were obvious to all those involved. Defensive positions were considered too static, 
and combat intelligence was found to be sorely lacking. Armored units absorbed unnecessarily 
high casualties due to attacks against enemy strongpoints. The essence of the Tennessee 
Maneuvers provided the information that the Army needed to correct deficiencies endemic 
throughout its forces.  
When the 2
nd
 Army took the field on June 2
nd
, 1941, few could have anticipated the 
significance these maneuvers would hold. The Tennessee Maneuvers proved the soundness of 
armored doctrines espoused by men like Adna Chaffee, Charles Scott, and George S. Patton and 
the validity of reformed infantry formations and tactics created by George C. Marshall and Leslie 
McNair. The maneuvers provided the grounds to remove officers who proved incapable of 
adapting to the rigors of modern war and allowed abler officers to advance into positions of 
authority. The lessons learned in Tennessee would be tested and improved upon in later 
maneuvers, but many fundamentals emerged from the June 1941 actions. The vital importance of 
these war-games necessitate that the 1941 Tennessee Maneuvers not be forgotten or omitted 
from current and future studies. Indeed, the Tennessee Maneuvers laid the foundations of 
military tactics that would guide U.S. Forces to victory in World War II, and provided the 
impetus necessary to turn the United States military into the world’s premier fighting force.  
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